Integrating Europe’s Retail Banking Market: Where Do We Stand? CEPS Reports in Finance and Banking No. 38(?), 15 October 2007 by Kleimeier, Stefanie & Sander, Harald.
 
 
 
INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET 
  
  
   
 
 
INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET: 
WHERE DO WE STAND? 
 
 
STEFANIE KLEIMEIER 
AND  
 HARALD SANDER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES 
BRUSSELS 
 Stefanie Kleimeier is an Associate Professor of Finance at the Limburg Institute 
of Financial Economics, Maastricht University, and a Fellow of METEOR, 
Maastricht University.  
Harald Sander is a Professor of Economics and International Economics with 
the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Applied 
Sciences Cologne, and also an Extramural Fellow of METEOR, Maastricht 
University. 
Acknowledgements: The authors wish to thank the participants of the CEPS Task 
Force on the Internal Market for Retail Financial Services for valuable 
comments on earlier drafts of this report. Special thanks for critical comments 
are due to Rym Ayadi, András Janecskó, Karel Lannoo, David Rees and Dirk 
Schoenmaker. All remaining errors are ours. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the 
authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are 
associated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN-13: 978-92-9079-734-0 
© Copyright 2007, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise – 
without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: 32(0)2 229.39.11 Fax: 32(0)2 219.41.51 
E-mail: info@ceps.be 
Website: http://www.ceps.be  
 
CONTENTS 
Executive Summary.................................................................................................i 
1. Introduction........................................................................................................1 
2.  Integrating Europe’s retail banking market: Where do we stand?.............5 
2.1  European financial markets: State and development........................5 
2.2  Measuring integration and the efficiency of European 
retail banking...........................................................................................9 
2.3  The current state of retail banking integration.................................13 
2.3.1 Cross-border activities...................................................................13 
2.3.2 Integration as nominal interest rate convergence.........................24 
2.3.3 Integration as nominal interest rate cointegration........................33 
2.3.4 Integration as real interest rate convergence.................................39 
2.4  Integration of the retail banking market as an economic 
means......................................................................................................45 
2.4.1 Competition and efficiency in European banking .........................46 
2.4.2 Intermediation margins and the importance of global 
benchmarking................................................................................57 
2.4.3 Interest rate pass-through: Monetary transmission, 
competition and integration..........................................................62 
2.4.4 Financial development and retail banking efficiency ....................65 
3. Policy  implications..........................................................................................68 
3.1  General policy considerations.............................................................68 
3.2 Securitisation.........................................................................................69 
3.3  Ownership and supervision................................................................72 
4. Conclusions ......................................................................................................75 
Bibliography..........................................................................................................79 
Appendix...............................................................................................................87 
 List of Figures 
2.1  Mergers and acquisitions in European banking markets .................... 17 
2.2  Market integration through local ownership and the asset share 
of foreign banks – Regional presence of foreign banks........................ 19 
2.3  Cross-border penetrations of banks in the eurozone............................ 22 
2.4  The development of nominal retail interest rates ................................. 25 
2.5  Coefficient of variation for selected nominal retail interest rates 
 in the eurozone.......................................................................................... 28 
2.6  Coefficient of variation for nominal retail interest rates in the EU..... 29 
2.7  The validity of the law of one price......................................................... 33 
2.8  Bilateral cointegration of nominal retail interest rates......................... 35 
2.9  Cointegration of nominal retail interest rates in the eurozone ........... 37 
2.10  Inflation rates in the EU............................................................................ 42 
2.11  The development of real retail interest rates ......................................... 43 
2.12  Coefficient of variation for real retail interest rates in the EU............. 44 
2.13  Concentration levels in the retail banking market................................ 50 
2.14 Interest  rate  margins.................................................................................. 58 
2.15  Benchmarking margin convergence in the eurozone against 
margin convergence at the global level.................................................. 61 
2.16  Cross-country variations in the eurozone’s pass-through process..... 64 
2.17  Development of the banking market...................................................... 66 
3.1  The trilemma of financial supervision: Choose two and only two..... 73 
List of Tables 
2.1  Total assets, credit and deposits of domestic European credit 
institutions.................................................................................................... 7 
2.2  Financial integration channels................................................................. 14 
2.3  Consolidation of the European banking market................................... 15 
2.4  Market integration through local ownership and the asset share 
of foreign banks – National presence of foreign banks........................ 20 
2.5  The structure of the European banking sector in 2004......................... 48 
2.6  The structure of the European retail banking sector ............................ 52 
2.7  Customer mobility in the European retail banking market..................54 
| i 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1.  Introduction 
The creation of a single retail banking market in Europe has recently 
become the focal point of the European single market project. An obvious 
reason for this increased attention is that integration has so far fallen short 
of expectations, which is partly owing to the well-documented slow 
progress in the integration of the retail banking market.1 While the 
integration of other financial markets, such as bond, equity or wholesale 
banking markets, has been rapid – especially given that the introduction of 
the single currency has eliminated exchange rate risks within the eurozone 
– the currently emerging consensus is that retail banking markets have 
been disappointingly slow to change. Some of the disappointment may be 
rooted in exaggerated expectations, originating not at least from the 
estimates in the Cecchini report of the costs of ‘non-Europe’ (European 
Commission, 1988). Many academic observers assert that these estimates 
were excessive and that they were put forward “with a total lack of 
academic rigor” (Freixas, 2003, p. 1). Moreover, it is increasingly argued 
that the original ideas for creating a single market rested too much on the 
hope of obtaining economies of scale while giving too little emphasis to the 
role of competition and free market entry (see e.g. Sapir et al. 2004; 
Delgado, 2006). Although this position is often voiced with respect to the 
entire single market project, it is more relevant with respect to retail 
banking, where economies of scale are much harder to find. A more 
fundamental reason for the renewed focus on retail banking is that 
integration is not simply an objective in itself but a principal means to 
create an efficient European financial system, which is considered a key 
stimulant for economic growth and productivity as envisaged in the Lisbon 
agenda. 
                                                 
1 Recent overview assessments are given by Baele et al. (2004), Barros et al. (2005), 
Walkner & Raes (2005) and the annual Financial Integration Monitor (European 
Commission, 2004, 2005a, 2006a). ii | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
The CEPS Task Force on the Internal Market for Retail Financial Services 
was established to develop constructive proposals for the completion of a 
genuine market for retail financial services within the European Union 
(EU) with the ultimate goals of advancing the Lisbon growth and 
productivity agenda and of improving the quality and access to financial 
services (CEPS, 2005). As part of the work of this Task Force, the present 
report has been produced as a background paper reviewing the academic 
evidence on integration in the retail banking market. 
2.  The academic evidence on the integration of the retail banking 
market 
The majority of academic observers agree that retail banking still represents 
the most segmented financial market in Europe. The existing evidence 
generally confirms this view. Nevertheless, the appropriate measurement 
and benchmarking of banking market integration are crucial to avoid 
jumping too quickly to incorrect policy conclusions. More specifically, 
some commonly-used integration indicators should be interpreted with 
caution as they may wrongly encourage ‘over-harmonisation’ while at the 
same time understate the role of competition and broad-based financial 
development policies. What do popular indicators reveal, what are their 
limitations and what do alternative measures say about the state of 
integration in the retail banking market? 
Quantity-based indicators 
Quantity-based indicators directly measure cross-border activities. These 
indicators, especially the numbers of mergers and acquisitions and the 
volume of cross-border loans and deposits, tend to show comparatively 
low levels of these activities. This situation is widely viewed as a sign of 
limited integration. This assessment is correct in general, but it is important 
to realise the limitations of these indicators: in fact, the absence of cross-
border activity could itself signal that an integrated market has already 
been achieved. For example, if prices for petrol are the same across Europe, 
no one will travel across the border anymore to fill their car tank. 
Conversely, the very recent wave of cross-border mergers is often 
interpreted as a sign that integration is gaining momentum. Although that 
may be true, this wave might also simply reflect the fact that banks are just 
about to discover the benefits of cross-border activities in a still highly INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | iii 
fragmented market. Thus, measures that focus solely on flows rather than 
on stocks may paint the wrong picture. For example, Schoenmaker & van 
Laecke (2006, p. 1) calculate a transnationality index for banking to assess 
the state of cross-border banking and arrive at the conclusion that 
“European banking is finally arriving”. Still, their study looks at the overall 
banking business. Whether the current state of Europeanisation of banking 
will be sufficient to create a single market for retail banking, given the 
peculiarities in this sub-sector of the industry, remains to be seen. Hence, 
quantity-based measures are difficult to interpret and need (at least) to be 
complemented by other indicators. 
Price-based indicators 
Are price-based indicators, i.e. indicators using retail interest rates, the 
better indicators of integration? The answer is a ‘definite maybe’! First, 
similar prices will only tell us something about market integration when 
they relate to comparable goods. German apples that carry the same price 
tag as French oranges will not signal a single European fruit market. As 
retail banking products are still quite diverse, not to mention divergences 
in statistical reporting across Europe, the ‘law of one price’ may not tell us 
much about integration. Moreover, even if the products were 
homogeneous, prices can and should differ when there are differences in 
the underlying risks. It is therefore unimportant whether or not nominal 
returns equalise or converge. In an integrated market only the risk-adjusted 
returns should be equal. Unfortunately, the available data on retail interest 
rates are not sufficiently homogenised. Furthermore, while it is possible to 
calculate risk-adjusted returns in financial markets (see e.g. Flood & Rose, 
2004), risk measures are not easily obtainable in retail banking markets. 
Interest-rate convergence indicators are nonetheless used regularly to 
assess the state of integration.2 They reveal that nominal interest rate 
convergence has taken place mainly for corporate loans and mortgages and 
that the convergence – at least within the eurozone – was most pronounced 
in the late 1990s. The main driver of this process was the convergence of 
market interest rates in bonds and money markets. While the available 
price-based measures may thus indicate some convergence, simple nominal 
interest-rate convergence should not be misread as integration and vice 
versa! A case in point is the mortgage market, where rates often show a 
                                                 
2 See for example the annual Financial Integration Monitor of the European 
Commission (European Commission, 2004, 2005a, 2006a). iv | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
high degree of convergence despite a largely fragmented market. Retail 
interest rates are, however, useful indicators of integration as they can tell 
us to what extent prices are driven by specifically national or regional 
factors and to what extent they are driven by common factors. If national 
interest rates react similarly to shocks in common factors and therefore 
exhibit a certain degree of co-movement over time, this can suggest 
integration. As one type of news-based indicator, one can use cointegration 
analysis to investigate such long-term co-movements. These more reliable 
analyses typically reach the following findings: 
•  The level of integration in the retail banking market is generally still 
low. 
•  In lending, the degree of integration is highest in lending to 
corporations. There is some integration in mortgage lending. The 
lowest level of integration is found in consumer credit. 
•  On the deposit side, most of the evidence of integration is present in 
the more competitive market for time deposits, while demand and 
savings deposits show only very limited – if any – signs of 
integration. 
•  The introduction of the euro appears to have exercised a marginally 
positive effect on integration. 
These results are in line with theoretical expectations. Markets where 
competition is strong are more integrated – be it because of strong 
competition within a country’s retail banking system or because of 
alternatives made available by market-based financial services (e.g. money 
market funds instead of time deposits), owing to low switching costs (time 
versus demand deposits) and fewer information asymmetry problems (for 
mortgages as opposed to consumer credits) or to low barriers to (foreign) 
entry. These analyses may be better suited to assess market integration, but 
they generally suffer from data availability problems and are neither 
always readily available nor always fully reliable. Cointegration analyses 
hence provide additional insights but they need to be complemented with 
other analyses. 
Convergence of real interest rates 
Finally, one may look at real interest rates, which reflect the real returns on 
assets and the real financing costs of firms. In a fully integrated economy, INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | v 
real interest-rate equalisation would be the strongest test for integration, 
but it requires simultaneous goods and financial market integration. Not 
surprisingly, given the substantial differentials in inflation rates, especially 
in the eurozone after the initial inflation convergence prior to 1999 under 
the influence of the Maastricht convergence criteria, real interest rates have 
shown no further convergence but rather some degree of divergence since 
then. Different degrees of integration of product and financial markets 
should as such remain a concern for policy-makers, which may need to be 
addressed simultaneously. Retail banking markets in Europe thus appear 
to fail this ultimate test for integration. 
Given the limitations of quantity- and price-based measures of integration, 
it is important to measure whether integration has achieved its objectives. 
Therefore, regular in-depth analyses of competition in retail banking such 
as the recent sector enquiry by the European Commission’s DG 
Competition (European Commission, 2006b) are highly welcome. These 
analyses typically use a large set of indicators on market structure, 
concentration, performance and conduct, as well as on barriers to entry. In 
this report some of the key findings of competition analyses are reviewed 
and extended.  
Competition  
The European Commission’s enquiry perceives competition and efficiency 
as essential elements for the EU’s single market project. The evidence 
presented points to limitations in competition and the existence of barriers 
to entry. The entry of foreign banks is nevertheless expected to have pro-
competitive effects, inducing domestic banks to compete and improve their 
services. Additionally, the mobility of customers can enhance the 
competitive nature of a market. Yet market characteristics differ not only 
across countries but also across regions within countries. Consequently, 
market entry and competition will remain vital to achieving growth-
enhancing, efficient European banking markets. 
Global versus regional integration: Benchmarking European integration 
Without proper benchmarking, the impact of changes in the global banking 
business induced by technological and financial innovation along with 
general deregulation can easily be misread as a success or failure of 
regional integration policies. This point can be illustrated by intermediation 
margins. These margins have generally gone down in Europe and vi | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
converged over the past decade. While this trend can be read as a sign of a 
more competitive and integrated European market, financial markets are 
also developing and integrating on a global scale. With proper 
benchmarking it can be shown that the margin convergence that is specific 
to the eurozone and which cannot be attributed to global factors can only 
be found for corporate loans prior to 1999. In contrast, mortgages even 
show signs of divergence since 1999. 
Interest rate pass-through  
Interest rate pass-through analyses can complement traditional competition 
analyses as they reveal how quickly and completely retail interest rates 
adjust to changes in policy or market interest rates. A limited pass-through 
points to market imperfections in retail banking. A heterogeneous pass-
through across countries reveals a limited institutional convergence process 
that works against the law of one price. At least in the eurozone the 
disappearance of exchange rate risks has led to a largely integrated 
wholesale market where the law of one price applies. Remaining price 
differentials for identical retail products thus reflect differing degrees of 
competition. The pass-through results are generally consistent with the 
cointegration results mentioned earlier and reveal that: 
•  The pass-through in the short-term corporate lending market is faster 
and more homogeneous than it is in other lending markets. 
•  In the eurozone, particularly mortgage and consumer lending rates 
show a highly heterogeneous response to monetary policy. 
•  In the new member states the pass-through is typically faster, more 
complete and more uniform than it is in the eurozone, but these 
properties still differ as they are strongly influenced by the state of 
competition and the relative importance of foreign bank participation. 
•  Most integration effects to date have been achieved by integrating 
wholesale markets and not by integrating retail markets.  
•  An integrated wholesale market that equalises the cost of funds for 
banks plus a competitive retail market would be sufficient to equalise 
risk-adjusted returns and could in turn produce the very outcomes 
that one would expect from an integrated market. Consequently, 
increased integration effects can come from three sources: 
–  the further integration of wholesale markets; INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | vii 
–  an extension of the eurozone, especially with respect to the new 
member states; and 
–  increased competition in the retail banking markets. 
In sum, the academic evidence clearly indicates that integration in the retail 
banking market is limited in Europe. That being said, some integrating 
effects have been achieved in the eurozone. These effects were most 
pronounced in the run-up to the monetary union and shortly thereafter. In 
more recent years, integration seems to have lost momentum. The strongest 
integration effects are concentrated on those products where the highest 
degree of competition within the banking sector and from outside the 
banking sector (such as from arm’s length finance) can be found. Moreover, 
the integration of wholesale markets appears to be a major driving force for 
integration, but only in conjunction with a competitive environment. 
3.  Why have retail banking markets been so resistant to 
integration?  
Two answers can be given to this question. One the one hand, it is more 
difficult to create a level playing field in retail banking than it is in other 
financial markets. On the other hand, there are economic and political 
reasons that work against full integration, so it is crucial to understand how 
retail banking differs from other goods or service markets: 
•  As integration in the wholesale banking market is a major driver of 
integration in retail banking, a lack of integration in wholesale 
banking along with nationally fragmented payment systems in 
particular, are potentially significant obstacles to integration in retail 
banking. 
•  As deposit-taking and lending activities involve default risks and are 
plagued by information asymmetries, credit rationing may occur and 
forms of relationship banking can easily develop, making retail 
banking a highly localised activity where proximity to the customer 
may create competitive advantages for incumbent banks. Thus, 
barriers to entry to a foreign retail banking market are high. 
•  Retail banking often involves high switching costs, i.e. where 
changing a bank imposes high costs on the customer, reinforcing 
long-lasting bank–customer relationships and in turn barriers to 
entry.  viii | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
•  The banking business is fragile by nature and prone to systemic 
(default) risk. As such, it requires regulation and supervision. In 
Europe, these tasks are assigned to national authorities, a structure 
that may lead to actual or perceived barriers to entry.  
•  Banking is important in financing economic activity and impacts on 
other sectors as well as on overall economic performance. National 
policy-makers therefore often view banking as a strategic sector and a 
major means for influencing economic development. 
To summarise, when assessing the state of integration in the retail banking 
market one needs to understand and clarify how far integration in retail 
banking can go and how far it should go. Such an understanding should 
help to find a new balance between integration and competition policy 
with a strong focus on creating a highly efficient retail banking market. 
4.  The future of integration in the retail banking market in Europe 
Several propositions can be made regarding the future of the retail banking 
market in Europe:  
•  European financial market integration is just about to start. It can and 
it will go further and both internal market and competition policies 
can be of assistance.  
•  Integration can proceed by means of not only cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, cross-border lending and deposit-taking, but also by 
low(er) barriers to market entry, market contestability in general and 
a competitive domestic environment more specifically. In this respect, 
openness to extra-regional markets can also lead to more competition. 
•  Integration will ultimately be limited by the localised nature of retail 
banking. It is essential to recognise the limits of integration to avoid 
overburdening the internal market regulation.3  
•  The economic limits of retail banking integration provide 
diversification opportunities for banks’ loan portfolios as risk and 
return differ across national banking markets. This suggests that in 
the coming years the efficiency and growth-enhancing role of retail 
banking can be improved. To achieve this, three more inputs seem to 
be important: 
                                                 
3 See also Barros et al. (2005). INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | ix 
–  Competition and competition policy in national markets are 
vital, as price stickiness is still a substantial feature of European 
retail banking. 
–  It can be argued that the single market programme has possibly 
been built too much on the logic of achieving economies of scale, 
both in general and in particular with respect to retail banking, 
where the evidence of scale economies is at best mixed. Thus, 
competition policies, which help to create and maintain open 
banking markets, are fundamental. 
–  It is not only crucial how the banking market itself develops, but 
also how the capital markets in Europe evolve as this will 
eventually have a positive impact on bank intermediation. 
•  The integration process so far has been largely driven by wholesale 
market integration, which in turn was spurred by monetary 
integration. In this regard, three further elements are central to 
greater integration in the retail banking market: 
–  extension of the eurozone; 
–  the creation of the single European payments area (SEPA); and 
–  further progress towards an integrated European capital 
market, which has recently seen rapid development (Casey & 
Lannoo, 2005). Experience in the United States indicates that the 
integration process can be accelerated by fast-evolving 
secondary credit markets and securitisation, but can also imply 
tremendous risks for financial stability.  
In sum, a broad-based perspective on financial market integration that 
looks at the joint development of retail and capital markets is the key to 
further retail banking integration. This viewpoint, however, requires a 
strong focus on competition in retail banking without compromising 
financial stability in order to obtain the much sought-after growth benefits 
from an integrated retail banking market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Why do we want an integrated market? 
For an initial answer to this question, it is worth recalling that the 
motivation for regional integration in Europe has always been political, 
eventually even aiming at the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’, as 
advocated by Jean Monnet. The means to achieve that objective have 
always been economic, however. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 identifies in 
Article 2 the creation of a unified economic area with a common market as 
the task of the Community. Thus, the quest for a single European banking 
market could be understood as a vital part of the European integration 
project. Nevertheless, integration is not simply an objective in itself but is 
essentially also an important means to deliver economic benefits.  
This point was implicitly contained in the original Cecchini report 
(European Commission, 1988). According to this report, financial 
integration should cause prices of financial services in many European 
countries to fall by 25% by converging to the prices of the lowest-cost 
supplier. Integrated banking markets should deliver benefits by reducing 
costs and increasing benefits for all retail banking customers. Integration in 
retail banking can hence be viewed as a means to improve the efficiency of the 
financial service sector by providing consumers with the best savings 
opportunities and giving small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) access 
to deep and liquid markets for raising capital.  
Moreover, there is now an emerging consensus among many observers, 
including the European Commission, that “an efficient and integrated 
European financial market will help to support growth and job creation 
within a competitive economy”, as envisaged in the Lisbon agenda 
(European Commission, 2001, p. 15). In this context, retail banking can be 
viewed as a key sector that can help to promote a growth-enhancing 
integration of other product and service markets. Financial integration is 
therefore a significant means to enhance economic growth. Finally, the 
integration of financial and banking markets helps to reduce asymmetries 
in the retail interest rates faced in the various eurozone countries even in 2 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
the presence of a single monetary policy. As such, financial integration can 
also be a means to harmonise the impact of monetary policy. 
What regulatory progress has been made?  
In practice, the objectives of integration and economic development have 
always been inseparable, as was already evident in the Treaty of Rome. 
With respect to the creation of a single market for financial services, next to 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome key regulatory milestones include the 1977 First 
Banking Directive, the 1985 Second Banking Directive, the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty and the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan. Dermine (2003) argues 
that each of them characterises a new phase in Europe’s legal environment: 
deregulating entry (1957–73), the harmonisation of banking regulations 
(1973–83), the completion of the internal market (1983–92), the creation of 
the single currency (1999) and the Financial Services Action Plan (1999–
2005). Regarding the importance of the European monetary union (EMU), 
as Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2000, p. 2) from the board of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) argues, “multiplicity of currencies in the single market 
was a fundamental factor behind the preservation of the segmentation of 
the banking industry” and “it is indeed the existence of a single currency 
and a single central bank which very often unifies a banking system”.  
By now, there is widespread consensus among policy-makers and 
academics that despite these regulatory efforts European retail banking 
integration is lagging behind the ultimate objective of providing a single 
market for financial services for Europe. For example, as Freixas (2003, p. 1) 
concludes, “[b]arriers to entry are still today’s most relevant challenge of 
European financial integration”. Differences in objectives between 
European and national regulators (just witness ABN-Amro’s struggle to 
obtain the controlling share in Italy’s Antonveneta in September 2005) as 
well as the persistence of non-regulatory barriers to integration continue to 
exist. The former has led the European Commission (2005b) to publish a 
Green Paper on financial service policies over the period 2005–10. The focus 
now lies on implementing existing rules rather than creating new ones.4  
                                                 
4 For example, after realising the slow progress in the integration of the retail 
banking market, which is at least partly caused by a fragmentation of the national 
regulation of financial products in the 25 EU member countries, the Commission is INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 3 
How much can regulation achieve?  
While regulatory barriers can be addressed by policy-makers, non-
regulatory barriers cannot. It is thus essential to take the latter properly into 
account. In retail banking, trust and confidence are key considerations for a 
customer when choosing a bank. Hence, knowledge of the bank and the 
national legal system will create differentiated banking products and 
cultural differences in consumer behaviour. Moreover, banking typically 
suffers from asymmetric information problems, i.e. the borrower has better 
knowledge about his or her capacity to repay than the lender. To the extent 
that local or national knowledge reduces this information asymmetry, local 
lenders might have an advantage over foreign lenders. Particularly retail 
services, such as relationship lending to SMEs, might always be provided 
by local banks that best understand the local market, language and culture 
and which have superior information about local businesses.  
In a market where proximity to customers remains fundamental even in an 
age of modern distribution technology, legal integration may be insufficient 
to create full market integration. As argued by Berger (2003, p. 40) in a 
study on global integration in the banking industry, “despite…reduced 
barriers, the integration of the banking industry in most developed 
countries has fallen far short of the expectations of many observers”. As a 
major reason for this Berger holds that “foreign banking organizations may 
be at significant competitive disadvantage in providing the price, quality 
and mix of services that best suit bank customers, and that such 
disadvantages may limit the integration of the banking industry”. Clear 
exceptions are countries with an underdeveloped banking system. As such 
it is not surprising that foreign bank penetration is mostly found in the new 
member states (NMS) and that European mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
are more often than not motivated by gaining better access to Central and 
Eastern European banking markets, while cross-border M&As have been 
the exception rather than the rule across the old member states of the 
European Union (EU-15).  
What are the implications for the measurement of integration?  
Whereas the distinction of an integrated retail banking market as a means 
or an end is of course somewhat academic, it helps to clarify and categorise 
                                                                                                                            
considering the idea of creating a 26th regime, i.e. to grant specific financial 
products (i.e. mortgages) a special European status.  4 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
objectives and their measurement. If integration is an objective in itself, 
measures of cross-border activities provide the most appropriate indicators. 
In this sense, M&As or cross-border deposit-taking and lending would in 
themselves be welcomed signs of integration. If integration is considered a 
means to create a more efficient retail banking market, indicators of the 
efficiency of the retail banking systems come to the fore. If the retail 
banking market is considered a means to promote growth, even more 
broadly based analyses of financial system development may be called for. 
We therefore regard banking market integration as one but not the only 
means to create an efficient, stable and growth-enhancing financial sector in 
Europe. This view allows us to review the opportunities and the limits of 
retail banking market integration as well as identify policy alternatives.  
| 5 
 
2. INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL 
BANKING MARKET:  
WHERE DO WE STAND? 
2.1  European financial markets: State and development 
Banks have always played an important role in Europe’s financial system. 
Historically, the European banking system developed from the unit-based 
banking system of the 17th and 18th centuries to the early 19th century’s bi-
polar system consisting of town-based banks financing domestic and 
international trade and country-based banks financing the local, 
predominantly agricultural economy. By the end of the 19th century, most 
European countries had a nationwide branch system. The competition 
between country-based (regional) banks and town-based (national) banks 
differed across countries and led to the heterogeneity still found in 
European banking today. Furthermore, the relationship between industry 
and banks also shaped the market. Whereas in the United Kingdom (UK), 
banks financed mostly trade and to a lesser extent industry, the ties 
between industry and banks were much closer in Continental Europe. 
Consequently, the UK developed a more market-oriented financial system 
while the Continental European system became mainly bank-oriented.  
Yet in general bank lending plays a dominant role in providing funds to the 
corporate, private and public sectors throughout Europe. As Table 2.1 
shows, bank credits amounted on average to 109.2% of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in the 25 member states of the EU (EU-25) from 1995 and 
2004. This share, however, reflects the significance of bank lending in the 
old member states of the EU, where the level of 114.6% is much higher than 
the 35.6% of the new member states (NMS). For comparison, the 2001 level 
in the United States (US) was only 40.7% and in Japan it was 79.7%. Retail 
banking accounts for 50% of total EU banking and is thus the leading 
banking sub-sector. In 2006, across the EU there were more than 8,000 6 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
credit institutions active in retail banking. In 2004, they contributed about 
2.5% to the EU’s GDP owing to €250–275 billion in gross income (European 
Commission, 2006b). Market-based forms of funding, and here in particular 
bond finance, are used to a lesser extent in the EU-15, where bank finance 
amounts to a substantial 33% of European firms’ financing sources 
(European Commission, 2004) while equity and bond market capitalisation 
amount to only 53% and 123% of GDP compared with 147% and 149% in 
the US, respectively (Fonteyne, 2006).  
The situation in the NMS is much less clear. Although financial 
development indicators still signal underdevelopment in all three areas, it 
nonetheless appears that in many countries the banking system is relatively 
more important than the other sources of finance, though the situation 
differs from country to country. Moreover, banking is rapidly evolving in 
the NMS, not the least because of an increasing influx of foreign direct 
investment into the NMS banking systems in recent years.  
The view of continental Europe as dominated by a bank-based system may, 
however, be drawn with too broad a brush. For obvious reasons this is 
evident in the transition countries of the NMS where banking is still 
underdeveloped. From Table 2.1 it appears that we can roughly distinguish 
two groups of countries: in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, 
households and firms have somewhat better access to finance. By contrast, 
in Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic they 
have more limited access to finance. In the latter country, access to credit 
has even decreased since 1997. Whereas credit growth can have positive 
effects (financial deepening) as well as negative ones (mispricing of risk 
under excessive credit growth), it is generally agreed that the observed 
credit growth in these transition economies of the NMS reflects financial 
deepening. This trend can be compared with the credit growth observed in 
Greece, Ireland or Portugal prior to 1999 (EBRD, 2005). But even within the 
EU-15, the significance of banking in terms of bank assets, credit granting 
and deposit-taking varies considerably across countries, from Germany on 
the one hand to Finland and Italy on the other.    
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Table 2.1 Total assets, credit and deposits of domestic European credit institutions  
Total assets as a % of GDP  Total credit as a % of GDP  Total deposits as a % of GDP   
 
Country 
Average 
1995–2004 
 
2004 
Average 
1995–2004 
 
2004 
Average 
1995–2004 
 
2004 
EU-25 227.7  215.1  109.2  114.5 86.3  94.3 
     EU-15  235.3  219.1  114.6  119.9 89.5  96.9 
         Austria  243.2  268.0  118.1  125.1 95.3  97.9 
         Belgium  302.8  322.3  98.5  107.2 119.0  142.8 
         Denmark b) 233.6  309.3  143.2  164.4 54.9  62.2 
         Finland  111.3  141.9  60.1  69.4 54.5  53.2 
         France  234.7  267.9  93.3  92.9 72.8  77.0 
         Germany a), b) 246.6  295.5  187.6  135.8 103.5  113.3 
         Greece  129.9  137.9  51.0  76.4 86.1  95.6 
         Ireland  314.3  486.4  125.9  176.2 109.9  122.7 
         Italy  152.6  168.4  85.3  88.0 58.9  58.0 
         Luxembourg b), c) 3,040.8  2,708.5  593.2  467.3 1,021.2  859.4 
         Netherlands  270.1  243.3  144.5  174.1 111.0  122.4 
         Portugal  207.4  242.5  113.7  136.8 104.2  102.2 
         Spain  181.3  205.0  103.2  120.6 96.6  104.4 
         Sweden  175.4  208.9  106.4  114.5 47.2  151.2 
         UK  332.8  406.4  133.6  142.2 103.6  117.6  
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Table 2.1, cont. 
    NMS  76.2  84.7  35.6  41.9 43.3  50.6 
            Cyprus  240.8  305.9  109.5  141.1 109.8  126.8 
            Czech Republic  120.9  99.7  54.2  38.7 61.5  69.2 
            Estonia  62.5  94.4  29.4  65.4 30.4  45.8 
            Hungary  57.4  80.1  29.7  48.3 41.5  44.4 
            Latvia  60.9  101.3  20.1  56.5 32.3  65.7 
            Lithuania  31.3  47.5  14.1  30.4 18.2  30.1 
            Malta  273.9  476.8  129.5  200.1 155.1  204.9 
            Poland  57.6  67.6  25.3  34.8 35.5  45.6 
            Slovak Republic  92.3  87.7  44.1  36.3 41.2  21.7 
            Slovenia  72.3  93.6  33.4  47.3 45.8  56.7 
a) Total assets refer to 2003. 
b) Total credit refers to 1997 to 2004. 
c) Total deposits refer to 1997 to 2004. 
Note: EU-25, EU-15 and NMS averages are purchasing power parity, GDP-weighted. 
Source: Data for total assets, total credit and total deposits are from Allen et al. (2005). 
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In addition, data for the more market-based financial system of the UK also 
reveal also a high importance of banking. In a similar vein, Fonteyne (2006) 
argues that in the US, banking is no less critical than in the EU, at least 
when measured in terms of lending to the private sector. The differences in 
the numbers stem from the fact that US banks securitise a much higher 
share of their loans (particularly mortgages). Consequently, these lending 
activities do not appear in the balance sheets of banks and they are mostly 
excluded from the much-quoted credit-to-GDP figures. When including 
securitised loans, Fonteyne reports for 2004 higher levels of bank loans to 
the non-financial sector for the US than for the EU, which totalled 118% of 
GDP in the US compared with 92% in the EU. 
In sum, it becomes evident that the view of a European bank-based 
financial system as opposed to a US market-based system is too simple. In 
Europe, both bank-based and market-based financial systems may have a 
strong development potential in the future with an especially relevant role 
for the interaction of both systems. 
2.2  Measuring integration and the efficiency of European retail 
banking 
A common definition of an integrated market highlights that in such a 
market, consumers and producers have equal opportunities regardless of 
their country of origin. Integration in retail banking should provide 
individuals with the best saving opportunities and give companies access 
to deep and liquid markets for raising capital. A unified market is expected 
to broaden choice and lower prices for financial services. In an influential 
study, Adam et al. (2002, p. 4) state, “[f]inancial markets are integrated 
when the law of one price holds”. As such, identical assets should sell at 
one single price regardless of the domicile of the consumer or producer of 
that financial asset. An identical product, priced differently across 
countries, would point to the presence of legal or economic barriers (or 
both) to a free flow of financial services across borders and indicate the 
existence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities. 
The argument of the Cecchini study (European Commission, 1988) for 
creating a single European market was based on the law of one price 
(LOOP) as the point of reference for market integration. According to this 
view, gains from trade should materialise as an increase in consumer rents 
when markets are integrating and prices are falling. More precisely, the 10 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
Cecchini study predicted that post-integration prices would fall to a level 
equal to the prices of the country with the lowest pre-integration prices. 
Gardener & Teppett (1995) estimated that these price reductions ranged from 
21% to 4% for the different member countries with an average reduction of 
11%. They were expected to result in a total gain in consumer surplus of ECU 
21.6 billion for the then eight member states: Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy and Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK. Accordingly, 
consumer rents would increase not only because consumers would obtain 
access to least-cost suppliers but also because a larger unified market could 
allow for substantial economies of scale. In fact, the single market programme 
was mainly driven by the quest for scale economies. In this almost ‘textbook 
view’, the integration of markets would allow the creation of larger 
corporations, e.g. by means of M&As, which could achieve major cost 
reductions. The theoretical prediction then is that the total number of 
corporations in the integrated market would be reduced. Given that these 
companies would then be present in all countries, consumers would benefit 
from a greater choice and lower prices because of stronger competition. 
What is more, the realised scale economies could also enable European 
companies to become stronger in global competition.  
While this logic is now increasingly questioned even with respect to 
product markets (see for example Delgado, 2006), it is yet more 
questionable with respect to retail banking markets where the evidence 
concerning economies of scale is at best mixed. In the 1980s, there was 
some evidence of firm-specific economies of scale only for very small 
banks, i.e. banks with less than $100 million in deposits (Clark, 1988). In 
later research, the evidence in favour of scale economies remained elusive 
(Piloff & Santomero, 1998; Calomiris & Karceski, 1998; Rhoades, 1998). 
More recently, Walter (2006) confirms these findings and conjectures that 
differences in bank operating efficiency generally tend to dominate scale 
economies in financial services. As a consequence, M&As may not deliver 
the expected scale economies but at best a once-and-for-all reduction in 
inefficiencies. The role of M&As as a vehicle for integration may therefore 
be limited, and may work best where differences in operating efficiencies 
between the acquiring and the acquired institution are largest, such as in 
deals involving banks in the NMS. 
When measuring integration according to the LOOP, the focus can be put 
on either the process or the state of integration. The process of integration 
can be studied directly by using input measures – cross-border M&As, cross-INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 11 
 
border borrowing and deposit-taking and the like. The state of integration 
can be assessed by output measures, which reveal the results of a more or 
less efficient arbitrage process by looking at interest rate convergence.5 These 
two measures are arguably the most popular ones (see the annual Financial 
Integration Monitor by the European Commission, 2004, 2005a, 2006a). The 
advantages of these measures are that they are easily available. 
Accordingly, we start our assessment of European retail banking 
integration by studying them.  
These measures have their caveats, however.  First, integration – (too) 
narrowly understood as cross-border M&As – is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for creating an efficient banking market. The absence of 
cross-border M&As can in fact signal the existence of an integrated market 
when integrated money or bond markets equalise the banks’ cost of funds 
and competition or contestable markets ensure pricing based on these 
marginal costs. In such a market, there would be no motivation for cross-
border M&As, lending or deposit-taking. Second, the LOOP manifests itself 
in financial markets as the interest rate parity (IRP), which in its uncovered 
form is difficult to establish owing to exchange rate volatility or exchange 
rate expectations. Whereas in the eurozone exchange rate risk is no longer a 
concern, that is not true for non-eurozone EU members. Third, price 
differences in retail markets may not only reflect legal barriers and 
regulatory differences that can be harmonised away but may also signify 
deeply rooted differences in financial structures, economic risks, 
information asymmetries and consumer preferences. Hence, retail banking 
prices may never fully equalise but only move  together. We therefore 
proceed to investigate alternative measures of integration. Instead of 
convergence of nominal interest rate levels, we consider real interest rate 
convergence since, on the most fundamental level, economic theory 
predicts that real rates of interest on physical assets and in turn on financial 
                                                 
5 In this report, we focus on retail banking as lending to and deposit-taking from 
consumers and SMEs. Consequently, we are interested in interest rates as prices of 
loans and deposits. We are aware, however, that retail banking involves other 
activities such as payment processing and that interest rates may not always 
properly reflect the actual price. This point is particularly important with respect to 
current accounts, where banks commonly charge fees for various services. Note 
that gross income per account differs substantially from country to country, 
ranging in 2004 from a maximum of €265 in Luxembourg to a minimum of €15 in 
Lithuania (see Figure 18 of European Commission, 2006b). 12 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
assets will converge as economies integrate. Furthermore, we measure the 
co-movements of interest rates through cointegration analyses and contrast 
these findings with the results of our convergence analyses. 
As we consider integration a means to promote retail banking efficiency, 
we additionally review various measures of competition and efficiency in 
order to obtain a broader and more complete picture of European retail 
banking integration. The first set of indicators measures bank performance, 
major features of the banking market and the impact that integration has on 
both. Second, as financial markets are also developing and integrating on a 
global scale, benchmarking is important. Without it, the impact of changes in 
the global banking business induced by technological and financial 
innovation along with general deregulation could be mistaken for a success 
or failure of regional integration policies. We thus present an analysis of 
intermediation margins in retail banking that separates global from 
regional effects. Third, measures of the so-called ‘interest rate pass-through’ 
can provide useful information. 
They shed light on the competitive situation in retail banking as they reveal 
the banks’ pricing behaviour. Generally speaking, competition is present 
when banks adjust retail interest rates quickly and fully in response to 
changes in market interest rates.  
They convey information about the homogeneity of the response of various 
national banking systems to monetary policy impulses. This of course is in 
itself extremely valuable under the condition of a single monetary policy 
regime.  
A homogeneous response across countries indicates the existence of an 
integrated retail banking market.  
Finally, an efficient and well-developed financial sector is key to financing 
economic activities. As such, it is a major means to enhance economic growth. 
There exists a large body of literature on this nexus of financial 
development and economic growth. Financial development is obviously a 
broad concept that – rather than focusing on one sector in isolation – 
encompasses all aspects of the financial sector and the linkages between its 
sub-sectors. Banking is a fundamental element in the finance–growth nexus 
in particular because retail banking is the major source of external finance 
for SMEs. But rather than viewing retail banking in isolation, its 
development should be considered part of the whole financial sector’s INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 13 
 
development.6 As such, financial sector integration may have the potential 
to contribute significantly to financial development but integration in retail 
banking can also make its own contribution. At the same time, the 
integration of other financial markets, especially wholesale markets, will 
have a substantial impact on retail banking efficiency and development. 
For example, integrated and thus larger money markets, corporate bond 
markets and secondary loan markets can contribute to improvements in the 
retail banking market. Therefore, we review attempts to measure the 
interaction between retail banking efficiency and financial development. 
2.3  The current state of retail banking integration 
2.3.1 Cross-border  activities 
Cross-border activities are quantitative measures of integration that reflect 
the channels of integration as illustrated in Table 2.2 and as such visualise 
integration as a result of cross-border M&As, the domestic activities of 
foreign-owned banks or foreign branches, or cross-border loans and 
deposits of domestic banks.  
The surveys by Walkner & Raes (2005) as well as the annual Financial 
Integration Monitors (European Commission, 2004, 2005a, 2006a) provide 
the most recent evidence in this area. As Table 2.3 clearly indicates, the 
European banking market has undergone a period of consolidation in 
almost all countries. From 1995 to 2006, the number of credit institutions 
decreased on average by 7% in the EU-15 as well as in the eurozone, 
whereas the NMS showed a substantially higher decrease of 27%. The 
countries in this latter region typically experienced this drop in the number 
of banks at the end of the 1990s, while more recently bank numbers have 
been increasing again. Underlying these trends can be both domestic and 
cross-border bank mergers (most likely the case for the EU-15) as well as 
the entry of foreign banks (as in the case of the NMS). 
 
                                                 
6 See, for example, the recent attempt by the International Monetary Fund (2006) to 
construct a financial index to investigate – among other things – the role of 
financial development for retail banking efficiency. For a short discussion, see also 
section 2.4.4 in this report. 14 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
Table 2.2 Financial integration channels 
Channel Strategy  Tools 
Local ownership  Branches  Bank-driven 
channel   Subsidiaries 
    Mergers and acquisitions 
    
  Local intermediation   ATM 
 Distribution  Internet 
   Phone 
   Credit  card 
Local purchase from a 
foreign-owned bank   
Consumer-driven 
channel 
Local purchase of a 
foreign product   
  Cross-border purchase  Diverse distribution channels 
   Direct  purchase  abroad 
Source: European Commission (2005a). 
 
Nevertheless, as Figure 2.1 illustrates, the vast majority of M&As take place 
between two domestic banks. As Walkner & Raes (2005, p. 22) state, 
according to the available data, cross-border mergers and acquisitions have 
not been a major feature of the EU banking sector. In terms of numbers, 
mergers and acquisitions among domestic credit institutions represent 
about 80% of total consolidation activity in the EU in each year since 1992. 
The only clear pickup in cross-border mergers and acquisitions is evident 
in the run up to the creation of the single market in 1992, when the share of 
domestic mergers fell to about 60%. However, cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions have never come close to exceeding domestic mergers and 
acquisitions. 
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Table 2.3 Consolidation of the European banking market 
  Number of credit institutions 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005  2006 
Change 
(%) 
Austria  –  1,019 995 898  875  848  836  823  814 796 818  819  -20 
Belgium  120 116 131 123  117  118  112  111  108 104 100  103  -14 
Finland  349 347 348 348  346  341  369  369  366 363 363  363  4 
France  –  – 1,258 1,226 1,158 1,099 1,050  989  939 897 854  842  -33 
Germany  3,651 3,542 3,420 3,238 2,992 2,742 2,526 2,363 2,148 2,148 2,089 2,057  -44 
Greece  39 41 55 59  57  57  61  61  59 62 62  62  59 
Ireland  –  – 71 78  81  81  88  85  80 80 78  78  10 
Italy  970 937 935 921  890  841  843  821  801 787 792  806  -17 
Luxembourg  220 221 215 212  211  202  194  184  172 162 157  152  -31 
Netherlands  744 658 648 634  616  586  561  539  481 461 401  367  -51 
Portugal  257 243 238 227  224  218  212  202  200 197 186  181  -30 
Spain  316 313 416 404  387  368  366  359  346 346 348  349  10 
                           
Denmark  204 203 213 212  210  210  203  178  203 202 197  190  -7 
Sweden  116 175 237 223  212  211  149  216  222 212 200  206  78 
UK  486 478 557 521  496  491  452  451  426 413 400  401  -17  
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Table 2.3, cont. 
Cyprus  – – – –  –  404  406  408  405 405  391  355  -12 
Czech  55 53 50 45  42  119  96  83  77 74  56  56  2 
Estonia  18 15 12  6  7  7  7  7  7 9  11  14  -22 
Hungary  295 292 286 294  260  241  230  225  219 217  214  213  -28 
Latvia  43 39 37 27  23  21  19  19  19 23  25  26  -40 
Lithuania  17 26 37 42  48  52  53  68  71 74  77  77  353 
Malta  – – – –  –  22  17  14  16 16  19  18  -18 
Poland  1,591 1,475 1,378 1,272  858  754  713  667  660 653  730  727  -54 
Slovakia  33 29 29 27  25  23  23  22  21 21  23  24  -27 
Slovenia  41 36 34 30  31  28  24  22  22 24  25  26  -37 
                           
Eurozone  6,666 7,437 8,730 8,368 7,954 7,501 7,218 6,906 6,514 6,403 6,248 6,179  -7 
EU-15  7,472 8,293 9,737 9,324 8,872 8,413 8,022 7,751 7,365 7,230 7,045 6,976  -7 
NMS  2,093 1,965 1,863 1,743 1,294 1,671 1,588 1,535 1,517 1,516 1,180 1,536  -27 
EU-25  9,565 10,258 11,600 11,067 10,166 10,084  9,610 9,286 8,882 8,746 8,616 8,512  -11 
Notes: The total number of credit institutions is calculated for the eurozone, EU-15, NMS and EU-25. The last column reports the percentage change 
in the number of banks between the first year for which data is available and 2006. 
Sources: Country data for 1995 to 2004 are obtained from Table 5 in Allen et al. (2005). Country data for 2005 and 2006 have been obtained from the 
ECB’s MFI statistics and represent the data for December 2005 and August 2006.  
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Figure 2.1 Mergers and acquisitions in European banking markets 
Panel A: Number of domestic versus cross-border M&As among depository 
institutions 
 
Panel B: Value of domestic versus cross-border M&As among depository 
institutions 
 
 
Source: Graphs 1 and 2 in Walkner & Raes (2005).  18 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
Very recently, however, cross-border M&As have been gaining 
momentum. In 2004, cross-border mergers accounted for less than 25% of 
the total number of bank mergers within the EU-25 but reflected 
approximately 80% of the total value (European Commission, 2006a). For 
example, the Dutch ING Bank bought German and Belgian banks. German 
HypoVereinsbank first acquired Austrian and NMS banks and has 
subsequently been bought by the Italian UniCredito. Spanish Santander 
took over the British Abbey National. Dutch ABN-Amro succeeded in 
buying the Italian Antonveneta and most recently the French BNP-Paribas 
bid for the Italian Banco Nazionale del Lavoro. Finally, Nordea Bank 
resulted from a merger of four Scandinavian banks. What makes this last 
case so interesting from an integration perspective is that Nordea 
established a single corporate structure using the status of a European 
company, aka Societas Europaea. 
Yet looking at M&As can lead to wrong conclusions, as M&As reflect flow 
and not stock figures. While the former basically should react to 
unexploited profit possibilities, caused by fragmented markets or efficiency 
gains (or both), only stock figures give information about the state of 
integration. Building on this idea, Schoenmaker & van Laecke (2006) have 
recently calculated a transnationality index (TI) for banking. This index 
investigates the internationalisation of three indicators: assets (loans and 
securities), revenues and employment. Based on the achieved TI scores the 
authors classify banks as “domestic”, “regional” or “international” and find 
that the number of predominantly European banks has increased from 7 in 
2000 to 11 in 2005. They conclude that “European banking is finally 
arriving” (Schoenmaker & van Laecke, 2006, p. 1). As a driving force they 
identify that cross-border banking may follow a non-financial trade 
pattern. 
Still, their analysis is based on overall banking activity and not solely on 
retail banking. Although it can be argued that this is a first step and retail 
banking might follow soon, the issue requires further investigation. So we 
also report some additional stock data on retail banking. Next to M&As, 
banks can also achieve a foreign presence through local ownership of 
subsidiaries or branches. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the number of foreign 
branches of European Economic Area (EEA) banks in the EU slowly but 
steadily increased between 1997 and 2004. The number of subsidiaries 
nonetheless remained almost constant until 2003 and only increased in the 
most recent year. It is thus not surprising that the assets of these branches INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 19 
 
and subsidiaries amount to just a small fraction in terms of GDP. That said, 
with the introduction of the Societas Europaea, the trend towards cross-
border branching could eventually gain momentum in the future.  
Figure 2.2 Market integration through local ownership and the asset share of 
foreign banks – Regional presence of foreign banks  
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Notes: Figure 2.2 shows own calculations for the EU-12, EU-15, NMS and EU-25 as 
unweighted averages across member countries. Country-level data have been obtained from 
Table 7 in Allen et al. (2005), who report the share of foreign credit institutions as a 
percentage of total assets of domestic credit institutions.  
Source: Table 7 in Allen et al. (2005) and own calculations. 
Figure 2.2 might still understate the role of foreign banks in the NMS, 
where foreign banks contributed largely to the build-up of a financial 
infrastructure. As Table 2.4 reveals, the asset share of foreign banks is on 
average higher in the NMS than it is in either the eurozone (see the EU-12) 
or the EU-15. Exceptions are Finland and Sweden in the EU-15 and Cyprus, 
Slovenia and Slovakia in the NMS. Overall, the evidence supports the view 
voiced by Berger (2003) that there are powerful market forces favouring the 
local banking industry that may not easily be overcome by reducing entry 
barriers. In contrast, in less developed countries and particularly in 
transition countries, where financial systems have had to be built from 
scratch, the foreign banking industry can play an important role. 20 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
Table 2.4 Market integration through local ownership and the asset share of foreign 
banks – National presence of foreign banks (in percentages)  
   Asset share of foreign banks   
Country 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Change 
Austria 3.4  2.7  2.7  2.8  19.4  21.4  19.6  19.4  471 
Belgium 30.4  26.9  23.7  24.9  24.9  24.0  22.9  23.2  -24 
Finland 8.4  8.2  9.5  8.1  6.8  9.1  7.4  59.5  608 
France 10.4  9.9  11.3  15.0  9.6  12.7  11.1  11.4  10 
Germany 4.3  4.3  4.0  4.1  4.7  6.1  6.0  6.3  47 
Greece 15.8  12.7  11.0  11.6  8.8  21.7  22.0  24.8  57 
Ireland 24.8  55.9  57.2  57.9  59.4  47.3  43.9  45.4  83 
Italy 7.0  8.0  7.4  6.5  5.5  5.6  5.9  7.7  10 
Luxembourg 92.5  94.5  94.5  92.2  94.6  93.7  93.9  94.1  2 
Netherlands 7.2  6.5  5.2  11.2  11.3  10.3  11.8  12.1  68 
Portugal 14.8  21.0  14.7  22.2  24.6  25.1  26.5  26.1  76 
Spain 12.5  11.5  9.2  9.0  11.2  9.9  11.0  11.5  -8 
                    Denmark 4.5  6.3  4.3  5.2  16.2  13.0  16.0  16.2  260 
Sweden 2.5  4.4  3.6  5.4  5.8  6.6  7.6  8.7  248 
UK 52.2  52.9  50.1  52.5  50.5  47.4  49.8  51.3  -2 
                    Cyprus 10.2  10.9  11.3  11.7  12.8  12.7  12.3  30.1  195 
Czech Rep.  24.0  26.0  39.0  75.4  93.3  94.2  95.9  91.8  283 
Estonia 29.0  90.0  90.0  97.0  98.0  98.0  99.2  98.0  238 
Hungary 53.0  64.0  66.4  68.1  70.0  90.7  83.0  77.0  45 
Latvia 55.0  63.1  66.2  69.9  67.8  54.4  53.9  57.8  5 
Lithuania 41.0  51.0  37.0  57.7  81.1  88.1  88.7  93.0  127 
Malta 47.1  56.5  56.7  57.9  59.2  72.8  68.2  39.1  -17 
Poland 15.3  16.6  47.2  69.5  68.7  67.4  67.8  67.6  342 
Slovakia 30.0  30.0  31.0  43.0  90.5  95.6  96.3  97.0  223 
Slovenia 5.0  4.8  15.3  15.6  15.6  23.1  24.2  38.0  660 
Notes: These country-level data have been obtained from Table 7 in Allen et al. (2005), who 
report the share of foreign credit institutions as a percentage of total assets of domestic 
credit institutions.  
Sources: Table 7 in Allen et al. (2005). INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 21 
 
It is also possible for banks to penetrate a foreign market without being 
physically present. Figure 2.3 provides information regarding cross-border 
loans. It clearly shows that wholesale market integration is far more 
advanced than retail market integration. Looking first at interbank loans, 
Panel A reveals an increasing trend for eurozone loans and – to a 
somewhat lesser extent – for EU loans but a decreasing trend for other 
foreign interbank loans. Between 1999 and 2006, total cross-border 
interbank loans increased from about 65% to 80% with eurozone and EU 
interbank loans accounting for about 40% and 60%, respectively. It would 
thus appear that the European integration effort has not only stimulated 
wholesale integration but has also led banks to favour the eurozone 
interbank market at the expense of the non-EU interbank market. Panel B 
provides corresponding data for retail banking by focusing on cross-border 
loans to non-banks. In contrast to wholesale markets, there is little 
indication of retail integration. Cross-border loans – though steadily rising 
– only amounted to about 11.5% of total loans at the beginning of 2006, and 
EU and eurozone cross-border retail loans clearly lagged behind the global 
development. The results shown here are in line with the findings of other 
studies concerning cross-border loans as well as deposits to non-banks. 
Baele et al. (2004) for example argue that the slightly increasing trend 
towards more cross-border lending is mainly driven by non-eurozone 
banks. 
Overall, we conclude from the cross-border activities of banks that the 
integration process is still slow (see also Cabral et al., 2002), at least in the 
retail markets of the EU-15 member countries. Yet this observation was also 
made when the US deregulated its banking market in the 1980s and 1990s 
by lifting the restrictions on interstate branching. Cross-border banking 
then made a slow start before finally gaining momentum. Nevertheless, US 
banking has to deal with much less fragmented legislation as well as a 
historically and culturally less diverse background than European banking 
does. In sum, the cross-border banking evidence is often interpreted as 
pointing to a still-fragmented retail banking market in Europe, which, 
however, also indicates that the integration process is slowly gaining 
ground.  
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Figure 2.3 Cross-border penetrations of banks in the eurozone 
Panel A: Cross-border interbank loans  
 
Panel B: Cross-border loans to non-banks  
 
Notes: Panel A reports Figure II-1.1.13 of the background document to the Financial 
Integration Monitor 2006 (European Commission, 2006a) and shows cross-border interbank 
loans in the eurozone (eu-z) as a percentage of domestic amounts. Panel B reports Figure II-
1.1.14 from the same source and shows cross-border loans to non-banks in the eurozone as 
a percentage of domestic amounts. 
Source: European Commission (2006a). INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 23 
 
At the same time, it should be noted that integration, as measured by these 
cross-border activities, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
creating an efficient banking market, for at least three reasons. First, a 
combination of integrated wholesale markets and competitive local 
markets could ensure that prices for financial services equalise. For 
example, if money market and bond rates as marginal cost-of-funds for 
lending activities were equal (as they are now in the eurozone) and if 
pricing was competitively based on marginal costs,7 then similar products 
would carry the same price. Second, further development and broader 
acceptance of market-based finance alternatives could provide both the 
sought-after alternatives and ample competitive pressure on retail markets. 
Third, if banking markets were sufficiently open to foreign entry or cross-
border arbitrage, national banking markets would be contestable. And in 
contestable markets, prices can adjust in anticipation of cross-border 
arbitrage activities. Under such conditions, there would be no motivation 
for cross-border M&As, lending or deposit-taking. The absence of such 
activities would then signal the existence of an integrated market rather 
than the lack of one. On the other hand, cross-border M&As are not an 
adequate condition to create an efficient banking market, especially when 
foreign institutions could gain dominant market positions because of 
competitive advantages related to size and scope. That being said, we 
realise that in practice cross-border M&As often play a vital role as drivers 
of integration. Still, the above discussion points to the importance of: 
  competition and competition policy;  
  enabling consumer access to lower-cost, cross-border financial 
services; and  
  a wider perspective involving the development of the whole gamut 
of financial services available to retail customers.  
We address these issues when discussing integration in a broader context 
in section 2.4. 
                                                 
7 This scenario would assume that marginal costs other than cost-of-funds were 
either unimportant or similar. Divergences could for example occur when marginal 
labour costs differ across countries, provided they were sufficiently important to 
produce financial products. 24 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
2.3.2  Integration as nominal interest rate convergence  
Interest rates, as price-based measures of integration, have been advocated 
for a variety of reasons but particularly because these data are more readily 
and easily available and are typically more accurate than the quantity-
based measures discussed above. Adam et al. (2002) suggest using retail 
interest-rate convergence measures to monitor the progress in European 
retail banking integration. The European Commission has followed this 
suggestion in its annual Financial Integration Monitor reports. In order to 
investigate interest rate convergence, one can use the ECB’s non-
harmonised national retail interest rate (NRIR) series, which are available 
until 2003. Since 2003, new harmonised monetary financial institutions 
(MFI) interest-rate statistics are reported. Unfortunately, these do not go 
back any further than 2003. As the new series are harmonised across 
countries, they are doubtlessly better suited to assess integration than are 
the old, non-harmonised series. Still, it is unfortunate that owing to the 
substantial differences between the non-harmonised and the harmonised 
series, discontinuity in the form of a clear break in the series is introduced. 
For a first impression, consider the development of nominal NRIR retail 
interest rates between 1995 and 2003 in the EU as presented in Figure 2.4. In 
the eurozone, there appears to be some convergence, which mostly took 
place in the late 1990s. Whereas country differences were smallest at the 
end of 2002 for mortgage rates, short-term corporate loan rates continued to 
show differences of up to 6.2%. Still, within a sub-group of eurozone 
countries excluding Germany, Ireland and Belgium, these rates seemed 
more aligned. Nevertheless, by 2003, more than a decade after the 1985 
Second Banking Directive came into effect and several years after the 
introduction of the single currency in 1999, the full convergence of interest 
rates had not yet been reached in retail banking markets. 
Not surprisingly, given the existence of exchange rate risks, the NMS show 
quite different and usually higher interest rate levels; but for these 
countries, convergence can also be observed. Whereas in 1995 interest rate 
levels were as high as 30% in several countries, especially in Hungary and 
Slovenia, by 2003 most national interest rates were below 10%. Exceptions 
were consumer loan rates, where Hungarian and Polish rates showed little 
convergence and remained high. Additionally, for Hungarian short-term 
corporate loan rates and time deposit rates there is more evidence of 
divergence in 2002–03. INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 25 
 
Figure 2.4 The development of nominal retail interest rates 
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Notes: National rates for the eurozone and NMS countries are reported in thin and dotted 
lines, respectively. NMS do not include Malta or Cyprus. Danish, Swedish and British rates 
are shown in thick line. 
Sources: Own graphs based on monthly interest rates provided by the ECB (NRIR interest 
rates) and national central banks. 
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Two measures have been suggested as formal statistical tests of 
convergence:  σ- and β-convergence. σ-convergence measures whether or 
not interest rates have become more similar over time when compared with 
each other or with a benchmark rate. In contrast, β-convergence measures 
the  speed with which national interest rates converge. With respect to 
banking market integration, this implies that countries with initially 
relatively high interest rates should show faster downward adjustment 
than countries with already low interest rates.8 The Cecchini study is very 
much related to the idea of β-convergence. Yet, given the heterogeneity of 
retail interest data as well as the heterogeneity of retail finance products 
(see also the discussion below of the relevance of the LOOP in retail 
banking) σ-convergence is the more practical concept and most commonly 
reported indicator. It is typically measured as the coefficient of variation 
(CV). 
Figure 2.5 shows the CV for the main retail loan and deposit types in the 
eurozone and provides an illustration of the development of σ-convergence 
over time. As expected, it shows that convergence took place mainly in the 
second half of the 1990s but came to a halt thereafter. Furthermore, there is 
a clear break between the non-harmonised and the harmonised interest rate 
series. In particular, the new harmonised series are much more similar. 
Nevertheless, no additional convergence can be observed. A continuous 
analysis of the integration process in the eurozone based on interest rate 
data can thus be misleading as it reflects not only economic but also 
statistical effects. In contrast, the 2006 Financial Integration Monitor reports 
continuous CV from 1993 to 2006 (see Figures II-1.1.1. to II-1.1.4 in 
European Commission, 2006a). These series are displayed in Figure 2.6. 
From 2003 onwards, harmonised MFI interest rates are used for the 
eurozone and Denmark. To overcome the break between the years 2002 
and 2003, preliminary estimates of the back series are used for these 
countries. For all other countries, non-harmonised national data are used.  
                                                 
8 Details regarding the methodology are provided in Box A1 in the Appendix. 28 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
Figure 2.5 Coefficient of variation for selected nominal retail interest rates in the 
eurozone 
 
 
Source: Figures 4 and 5 of Affinito & Farabullini (2006). INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 29 
 
Figure 2.6 Coefficient of variation for nominal retail interest rates in the EU 
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Mortgages 
 
 
Sources:  Financial Integration Monitor 2006, European Commission (2006a); Figures II-1.1.1 to 
1.1.4 are based on data from the European Commission’s Eurostat database. 
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A look at the figures for all 25 European countries in Figure 2.6 gives the 
impression of a strong convergence process (with the exception of rates on 
consumer loans to households). Yet a careful inspection of the eurozone or 
even the EU-15 shows that the convergence process in these countries has 
lost momentum. Hence, we conjecture that in these countries the 
convergence of retail interest rates has been largely driven by the reduction 
or complete elimination of exchange rate risk. The convergence of 
wholesale market interest rates is the major force behind this process and 
not the increased integration of retail markets, particularly if and when 
retail interest rates follow developments in market interest rates closely. 
Consequently, the still-continuing convergence process in the EU-25 is 
again most likely the result of the economic stabilisation and inflation 
convergence process in the NMS, which has led to a closer alignment of 
market interest rates.  
Choosing the LOOP – and thus convergence measures based on nominal 
interest rates – as the reference point for assessing financial market 
integration may have serious shortcomings, however, especially with 
respect to retail banking markets: 
At best, the LOOP can be considered an important point of reference when 
exchange rate risks are either non-existent – as in the case of the eurozone – 
or at least constant and as such negligible. 
Price differences in retail markets may not only reflect legal barriers and 
regulatory differences that can be harmonised away but also display deeply 
rooted differences in financial structures, economic risks, information 
asymmetries and preferences that may prevail. Accordingly, retail banking 
prices may never fully equalise but eventually only move  together. 
Methodologically speaking, the prices would then only be cointegrated. This 
idea is explored in the next section of this chapter. 
There is a growing body of literature that documents that even in product 
markets, where information imperfections are less distorting than they are 
in financial markets, the LOOP may not even hold for similar goods. Engel 
& Rogers (1996) have shown that similar goods can have different prices in 
different places not only because of transportation costs (measured by 
distance) but also because of the existence of borders. This finding holds 
even when the free flow of goods and distance (transportation costs) is 
controlled for. The authors attribute this failure of the LOOP at least partly 
to national differences in nominal price stickiness. As a result, national 32 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
retail rates would only move in tandem across borders when the degree of 
price stickiness is similar across the integrating countries and the marginal 
costs of producing a retail banking product are equalised, e.g. by a single 
monetary policy. Consequently, when money market rates equalise by 
means of an international arbitrage process in a monetary union, such 
changes have an impact on lending and deposit rates through domestic 
competition and other market characteristics. This integrative role of the 
single monetary policy is explored in greater depth in section 3.3. 
The LOOP ignores other product characteristics such as product variety, 
quality and efficiency, as well as the profitability of the financial service 
provider. Therefore, the European Commission (2005b) has adopted a 
broader, process-oriented definition of integration:  
Financial integration is a process, driven by market forces, in which 
separate national financial markets gradually enter into competition 
with each other and eventually become one financial market, 
characterised by converging prices, product supply and converging 
efficiency/profitability among the financial services providers. Several 
distinct and parallel channels can further financial integration, namely: 
cross-border ownership, establishment or cross-border service 
provision.  
To explore this issue further, we focus in section 2.4 on banking efficiency 
and profitability as well as on interest margins. 
As summarised in Figure 2.7, general arguments against the LOOP are 1) 
transaction and transport costs, 2) regulatory differences and 3) product 
heterogeneity. Following Lemmen (1998), it is useful to illustrate the (ir-
)relevance of the LOOP in financial markets by differentiating the two 
major components that constitute the ‘perfect capital mobility’ that is 
required for the LOOP to hold: full capital mobility, i.e. the absence of 
cross-border restrictions on capital flows and the full harmonisation of 
national and cross-border transaction costs and perfect asset 
substitutability. Single market regulation addresses restrictions in capital 
mobility. By doing so, it cannot make differing asset risks disappear unless 
it reaches for the full harmonisation of financial products in a fully 
integrated European economy in which all economic agents face the same 
risks independent of their nationality. The problem with LOOP-based 
measures such as nominal interest rate convergence or dispersion as 
measured, e.g. by CVs, is that only part of the divergence can be attributed INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 33 
 
to a lack of full capital mobility, which in turn could be addressed by single 
market legislation. The remainder may be beyond the reach of single 
market legislation – a fact that should be fully recognised to avoid over-
regulation. Thus, there is always some residual dispersion that cannot or 
should not be regulated away. In sum, integration must not lead to 
convergence and convergence does not necessarily reflect integration. 
Figure 2.7 The validity of the law of one price 
 
Source: Based on Lemmen (1998). 
 
2.3.3  Integration as nominal interest rate cointegration 
An alternative measure of integration is cointegration. Retail banking 
markets may resist full convergence owing to differences in national 
default risks, cultural influences in the bank–client relationship, country-
specific strategic bank behaviour, the lack of cross-border lending, the lack 
of international bank M&As and – for the eurozone at least up to January 
1999 – differing monetary policy conditions. Combined with the limitations 
of the LOOP outlined above, one may not even expect the LOOP to hold in 
this market and convergence studies can provide misleading results. 
Therefore, an alternative is to employ the concept of cointegration to 
analyse the state of market integration in retail banking when lending rates 
are tied together by a long-term equilibrium relationship that does not 
demand strict price or product equalisation.9  Cointegration analyses 
consider a setting where the time series of individual variables “can 
                                                 
9 Early studies that use cointegration to measure the integration of European 
banking markets include Centeno & Mello (1999) and Kleimeier & Sander (2000). 
More recent studies are Brada et al. (2005), Kleimeier & Sander (2003) or 
Heinemann & Schüler (2002).  34 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
wander extensively and yet some pairs of series may be expected to move 
so they do not drift too far apart” (Engle & Granger, 1987, p. 251). This 
concept realises that although full equalisation cannot be expected, the 
concept of market integration requires that interest rates should exhibit a 
certain long-term equilibrium relationship.10  
Up to now, cointegration has only been used as a measure of integration in 
the EU-15 and more specifically in the eurozone.11 Looking first at the early 
eurozone cointegration evidence obtained in Kleimeier & Sander (2000, 
2003) over a relatively long period from 1985 to 2002, different phases of 
cointegration can be identified in the eurozone. Whereas it appears that the 
retail lending markets were weakly cointegrated before 1993, these links 
disappeared in the mid-1990s. Yet around the introduction of the single 
currency, cointegration reappeared – at least in some retail markets, 
especially in the short-term corporate loan markets. Roughly speaking, 
cointegration analysis leads to a yes–no-yes integration pattern over time to 
which the changes – in particular the exchange rate mechanism crises in 
1992–93 – in the exchange rate regime seem to be most important. For the 
more recent period of the 1990s, the role of the single currency is central to 
the analysis, and it is believed by most authors to have introduced a shift in 
the structural relationships. Note, however, that as Kleimeier & Sander 
(2003) have shown for retail lending and deposit rates between 1995 and 
2002, the break occurred in many retail markets well before January 1999, 
thus pointing towards an anticipation of the EMU. In addition, there were 
clear differences across various retail markets. In loan markets, the highest 
degree of (co)integration took place in corporate lending, with some 
integration in mortgage markets and the least integration in consumer 
credit markets. In deposit markets, time deposits show the strongest 
evidence of integration, while demand and savings deposit markets do not 
appear to have been integrated. 
 
                                                 
10 For details on cointegration methodology, see Box A2 in the Appendix.  
11 For the NMS, Figure 2.4 has clearly shown that the convergence process is still 
underway and that interest rates continue to have distinct national trends. Thus, 
there is very little scope for integration in the sense of cointegration. Not 
surprisingly, cointegration has not been applied to these countries’ interest rates as 
an integration measure. 
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More recent results provided in Kleimeier & Sander (2006) confirm for 
mortgage and corporate loan rates the previously mentioned yes-no-yes 
pattern of bilateral cointegration within the eurozone (see Figure 2.8). For 
mortgages, cointegration dropped from 29 relationships in the pre-EMU 
sub-period from January 1995 to December 1998 (reflecting 32% of the 
possible 90 bilateral relationships among the 10 national rates) to as few as 
12, only to increase to 40 (44%) during the last EMU sub-period. Corporate 
loan rates show a similar pattern but reveal an overall higher level of 
cointegration reaching 57 (63%) bilateral cointegration relationships under 
the single currency. Cointegration relative to the aggregate eurozone 
average points to a similar pattern for corporate loan rates (not shown in 
Figure 2.8). During the last rolling period, 1999 to 2002, only two countries, 
Finland and Germany, were not cointegrated with the eurozone average. 
On the other hand, very little cointegration can be found for mortgage 
rates, where only one in five rates is cointegrated with the overall 
eurozone.  
Figure 2.8 Bilateral cointegration of nominal retail interest rates 
Panel A: Mortgages 
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Panel B: Short-term corporate loans 
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Notes: The eurozone includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The non-eurozone includes Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
Source: Based on data provided in Table 3 of Kleimeier & Sander (2006). 
 
For more recent cointegration evidence, we can no longer rely on the ECB’s 
non-harmonised NRIR series as these were discontinued during 2003. In 
Figure 2.9, we therefore provide evidence for cointegration relative to the 
aggregate eurozone using the new harmonised MFI interest rate statistics 
for the period from January 2003 to August 2006. Mortgage markets still 
show little sign of integration as reflected by the 33% of short-term and 17% 
of long-term mortgages that were cointegrated – also indicating that 
cointegration levels had not changed compared with the previous period. 
Short-term corporate loan markets continued to be highly integrated. Here 
cointegration levels were 75% for small and 100% for large corporate loans 
during the 2003–06 period – a result that reflects a continuation of the 
increase to 80% in the 1999–2002 period. Similarly, the market for short-
term time deposits, time deposits to SMEs and medium-term consumer 
loans appears to have been highly cointegrated.  
  
 
I
N
T
E
G
R
A
T
I
N
G
 
E
U
R
O
P
E
’
S
 
R
E
T
A
I
L
 
B
A
N
K
I
N
G
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
 
|
 
3
7
 
 
Figure 2.9 Cointegration of nominal retail interest rates in the eurozone, January 2003 – August 2006  
Panel A: Deposits 
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Panel B: Loans 
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Notes: Cointegration and the speed of adjustment are established according to Kleimeier & Sander (2006). The rates are for households 
(HH) and/or non-financial corporations (SME) as well as for new business (NB) or outstanding amounts (OA). Solid bars indicate the 
fraction of national rates that are cointegrated with the eurozone aggregate rate from 0 (=0%) to 1 (=100%). The hatched bars indicate the 
average speed of adjustment. 
Source: Own calculations based on the ECB’s harmonised MFI interest rates. INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 39 
 
Yet, a 100% cointegration level should not disguise the fact that the 
cointegration relationships are still very different across countries. For 
medium-term consumer credits, the speed of adjustment ranged from –0.11 
(reflecting an adjustment time of 9 to 10 months) in Spain to –0.64 
(reflecting an adjustment time of less than two months) in France.12 As this 
consumer loan category seems to refer – somewhat confusingly – to 
households as well as to SMEs, different countries might report different 
market segments or it might be the case that different market segments are 
more predominant in some national markets. As competitive forces vary 
across market segments, different adjustment speeds can result. Large, 
short-term corporate loan markets show adjustments that are more similar. 
Adjustment was immediate in only two countries (Luxembourg and 
Finland) whereas the speed of adjustment in all other countries was from  
–0.40 to –0.68 or at about two months. Given this limitation, markets for 
large, short-term corporate loans now appear to be fully (co)integrated. 
One further caveat, however, remains for all rates but is especially relevant 
for consumer loan rates: owing to the shift from NRIR to MFI, it is not clear 
to what extent the observed increase in cointegration is truly a sign of more 
integration or to what extent it simply reflects the more homogeneous 
nature of the MFI over the NRIR rates.  
In general, the cointegration results differ substantially from the 
convergence results presented before. Whereas the convergence of money 
market rates in anticipation of and under the single currency provides a 
picture of overall convergence of nominal retail banking rates, the image of 
segmentation, which the quantity-based approaches clearly show, is only 
consistently reflected in cointegration analyses. Loan products as well as 
lender and borrower behaviour remain different across the eurozone. 
Simple, nominal price-convergence measures of integration are not well 
suited for such an environment. It wou l d  i n d e e d  b e  s u r p r i s i n g  i f  i n  a  
market with different loan products or lending risks interest rates were 
equal. In such a setting, the cointegration measures of integration are more 
useful as they allow for such differences across national retail markets.  
 
                                                 
12 I t  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  f o r  f o u r  countries the speed of adjustment is 
statistically insignificant even though cointegration is found. Effectively, a long-
term relationship to which national consumer loan rates return exists in only 6 of 
the 10 countries, reducing the effective level of cointegration from 100% to 60%. 40 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
In sum, cointegration measures reveal that markets behave like integrated 
markets when both wholesale markets are integrated and retail markets are 
competitive. Consequently, the most integration is found in corporate loan 
markets and the least in lending to consumers. 
2.3.4  Integration as real interest rate convergence 
As another alternative we also consider real interest rate convergence. On 
the most fundamental level, economic theory predicts that real rates of 
interest on physical assets and consequently on financial assets will 
converge as economies integrate. More specifically, the real interest parity 
envisages the real rate of interest as the real rate of return on physical 
assets. As Goldberg et al. (2003, p. 299) argue, “[r]eal interest rate 
equalisation is, therefore, the broadest and arguably most theoretically 
appealing, of the various measures of financial integration”. Moreover and 
from a practical point of view, real interest rates simply give the real return 
on an asset or the real cost of financing for Europeans – and they are hence 
the most appropriate measure of the effects of integration in the sense of 
the Cecchini study. That being said, real interest rate equalisation 
simultaneously requires the integration of product and financial markets. 
For example, if financial markets are fully integrated but product markets 
are not, differences in real interest rates are an immediate result when 
nominal interest rates equalise in the presence of inflation differentials. In 
sum, real interest rate equalisation means more than just financial market 
integration. 
Nevertheless, in the presence of the remaining differences in nominal retail 
interest rates, be it because of limited integration or because of exchange 
rate risks for the countries outside the eurozone, the question arises as to 
which nominal interest rates the calculation of real interest rates should be 
based. If borrowing and investing activity reflected all the conditions of full 
capital mobility, the true real interest rates for European countries would 
be the lowest borrowing or the highest deposit rate minus their own 
national inflation rate. If, however, retail bank lending markets in Europe 
are domestic in nature, national retail rates minus national inflation rates 
are still the most relevant real interest rates. As Figure 2.3 has shown, less 
than 3% of all borrowers cross the border to obtain a bank loan from a 
foreign bank.  
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Even in the eurozone, where exchange rate uncertainty has been eliminated 
and transaction costs have generally declined for retail transactions, this 3% 
share is only slightly higher at 5%. It is thus reasonable to compare not only 
nominal but also real interest rates – defined as the national retail rate 
minus the national inflation rate.  
In all regions, the EU-15, the eurozone and the NMS, national inflation 
rates converged substantially prior to 2000 (see Figure 2.10). Yet since 2000, 
inflation rates, i.e. in the eurozone, show some tendency for divergence. 
Additionally, the EU-15 shows about the same level of dispersion as the 
eurozone. Angeloni & Ehrmann (2004) argue that inflation differentials can 
be expected to persist for two reasons. First, neither goods nor labour 
markets show a trend towards further and full integration. Second, the 
budget, tax, labour and competition policies, which determine inflation 
rates, are under national control and can be expected to withstand 
harmonisation in the near future.  
Given these persistent inflation differentials, real interest rates and hence 
real interest costs can be expected to vary substantially from the nominal 
interest rates discussed above. This expectation is confirmed by Figure 2.11, 
which presents real interest rates for the EU-25 countries. In contrast to 
nominal rates, real interest rates differ widely across countries and do not 
show much convergence. 
To measure ￿-convergence more explicitly, Figure 2.12 shows the CV for 
the eurozone, for those EU-15 countries that are not eurozone members 
(EU-3) and for the NMS. In general it can be observed that i) the CV was 
higher for the NMS than it was for the EU-3, which in turn was higher than 
that of the eurozone; ii) the CV in the eurozone was stable with a 
temporary increase in 1999 and 2000; iii) Greek real rates added to the 
dispersion within the eurozone; and iv) the CVs rose towards the end of the 
sample period, i.e. for mortgages.  
To conclude, given the enduring real interest-rate differentials, persisting 
or even increasing asymmetries across Europe remain a concern. For 
example, if Europe achieves full convergence of nominal retail loan rates, a 
country that achieves lower product prices by opening up its market will 
be punished by higher real interest rates. Consequently, this calls for an 
approach that simultaneously takes product and financial market 
integration into consideration (see also Delgado, 2006).  42 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
Figure 2.10 Inflation rates in the EU (in percentages) 
Panel A: EU-15 
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Notes: For the EU-15, rates for the non-eurozone member countries are presented with thick 
lines. For the NMS, rates for Cyprus and Malta are presented with thick lines. 
Sources: Own calculations of annual inflation rates based on the monthly national consumer 
price index (line 64f) from the International Financial Statistics published by the IMF and 
downloaded from Datastream except for Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Ireland 
(Central Statistical Office).  
Notes: National rates for the EU-12 and NMS countries are reported in thin black and dotted respectively. The NMS do not include Malta 
or Cyprus. Danish, Swedish and British rates are shown in thick black. 
Sources: Own calculations based on interest rates provided by the ECB (NRIR) and national central banks and CPI-based, one-year ahead 
inflation rates as reported in Figure 10. 
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Figure 2.11 The development of real retail interest rates (in percentages) 
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Figure 2.12 Coefficient of variation for real retail interest rates in the EU 
Panel A: Consumer loans 
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Panel C: Corporate loans 
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Source: Own calculations based on real interest rates shown in Figure 2.11. 
 
2.4  Integration of the retail banking market as an economic means 
Given the limitations of quantity- and price-based measures, indicators of 
the state and development of competition in retail banking in our view 
provide the most important evidence regarding the objectives that 
integration is supposed to achieve. The presence of competition and an 
integrated wholesale market, which equalises the cost of funds for banks at 
least in the eurozone, would be sufficient to equalise risk-adjusted returns, 
thus producing the very effects that one would expect from an integrated 
market. In this view, regular in-depth analyses of competition in retail 
banking such as the recent sector enquiry by the European Commission’s 
DG Competition (European Commission, 2006b) are highly welcome. These 
analyses typically use a large set of indicators on market structure and 
market concentration, market performance and market conduct, as well as 
review barriers to entry. While we report only some of the most significant 46 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  s e c t o r  e n q u i r y ,  w e  a dditionally investigate what interest 
rates and here specifically intermediation margins tell us about the state 
and development of competition.  
As financial markets are also developing and integrating on a global scale, 
benchmarking is crucial – for as noted earlier, otherwise the impact of 
changes in the global banking business induced by technological and 
financial innovation along with general deregulation could be mistaken for 
a success or failure of regional integration policies. We also report on 
enquiries into the pass-through from market interest rates to retail rates 
and highlight the implications of recent studies in this field for the state of 
competition, integration and monetary transmission. Finally, we present 
evidence on the interrelation of retail banking and financial development in 
general. 
2.4.1  Competition and efficiency in European banking  
In 2006, the European Commission argued that “[c]ompetitive financial 
services markets that serve European consumers and businesses efficiently 
contribute to economic growth and, therefore, to the achievement of the 
Lisbon goals” (European Commission, 2006b, p. 6). From the perspective of 
the European Commission, competition and efficiency hence appear not 
only closely related but also essential to Europe’s single market project. At 
the same time, the European Commission also recognises that the current 
retail banking market structures may preclude full competition and its 
benefits. Five features of the European retail banking market are of 
particular importance here: extensive international and national regulation; 
a traditionally high level of cooperation among banks; entry barriers; 
fragmented and differing market structures; and customer demand, which 
is hampered by information asymmetry, customer immobility and limited 
bargaining power. Given these features, the European Commission is 
especially concerned about potentially anti-competitive and consumer-
disadvantageous behaviour by banks: price coordination, non-price 
coordination (for example time delays for money transfers), increasing or 
stabilising entry barriers, enhancement of existing customer immobility 
and finally state intervention (for example to prevent foreign bank entry).  
First and most importantly, the number of banks and the resulting degree 
of concentration are an issue. The number of (domestic) banks but also 
cross-border bank mergers and other forms of foreign bank entry play a INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 47 
 
principal role here. In contrast to domestic M&As, cross-border M&As have 
a particular impact on competition: domestic M&As reduce the number of 
banks and increase concentration levels, whereas cross-border M&As do 
not affect the number of banks or concentration levels but nevertheless 
increase competition by introducing new banks to the market.  
Regarding the competitive effect of integration, it is argued that the entry of 
foreign banks induces domestic banks to compete and improve their 
services. Academic evidence suggests that the presence of foreign banks 
does indeed lead to a reduction in the profitability and margins of domestic 
banks. Additionally, one can also argue that not only market entry itself but 
also the threat of it – as suggested by the theory of contestable markets – 
could have the described effects. Walkner & Raes (2005) expect a significant 
amount of consolidation in the European banking market, which in turn 
will lead to a more competitive market with improved economies of scale 
and scope for banks. The general academic evidence with respect to the 
resulting effects on client welfare remains mixed, however, with some 
indication of welfare gains in moderately concentrated banking markets 
owing to lower lending rates, increased deposit rates and improved credit 
access. These benefits are balanced by a disruption of bank–client 
relationships, which especially affects small borrowers. Regarding 
efficiency effects, the evidence is controversial. Whereas studies 
investigating the effects of bank mergers find only limited economies of 
scale, other studies find overall improved efficiency and resilience to 
economic shocks for the whole sector (see Walkner & Raes, 2005). 
In the recent past, M&As took place mainly between domestic banks. Table 
2.3 and Figure 2.1 above have already illustrated that the number of banks 
has dropped in the EU. Not surprisingly, this drop in the number of banks 
has led to a distinct pattern of concentration across different national 
banking markets. Banking markets in the NMS are in general more 
concentrated than are those in the eurozone or the EU-15 (see Table 2.5). 
Even within each group, there are distinct national differences. 
Concentration levels in Hungary and Poland are more in line with the 
moderately concentrated markets in the eurozone such as Portugal, France 
and Greece. In contrast, concentration levels in Belgium and the 
Netherlands are more in line with the more concentrated markets in the 
NMS such as Lithuania and Malta.   
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Table 2.5 The structure of the European banking sector in 2004 
 Concentration    Profitability  &  efficiency    Solvency      Balance sheet 
 
Herfindahl 
index 
CR5 = 
share of 
5 largest 
banks   
Return 
on 
assets 
Return 
on 
equity  
Net 
interest 
income 
Cost-to-
income 
ratio     
Loans to 
customers  
Amounts 
owed to 
customers 
  
 (total 
assets) 
 (as a % 
of total 
assets)    
 
(as a % 
of total 
assets) 
(% of 
tier 1) 
 (as a % 
of total 
income) 
 (as a % 
of total 
income)    
Overall 
solvency 
ratio 
Tier 1 
ratio    
(as a %  
of total 
assets) 
(as a %  
of total 
assets) 
Austria   552   43.8     0.60  14.46  66.95  63.31   11.87  7.93   50.55  42.33 
Belgium   2,100   84.3     0.47  14.06  61.73  65.33   12.94  9.38   42.55  50.02 
Finland   2,680   82.7     0.71  8.03  67.12  56.81   19.36  16.73   53.16  40.15 
France   623   44.7     0.55  12.62  26.01  66.02   10.42  9.57   39.59  30.98 
Germany   178   22.1     0.12  3.87  55.86  68.89   11.82  7.51   42.91  35.17 
Greece   1,069   65.0     0.61  10.11  69.31  62.37   12.91  10.18   62.03  68.98 
Ireland   556   43.9     0.71  15.38  58.50  49.40   12.30  10.18   47.50  28.69 
Italy   230   26.0     0.61  10.58  61.08  58.08   11.65  8.67   59.17  43.84 
Luxembourg   304   29.7     0.48  11.30 41.35 53.94    16.88 13.92    20.57  37.44 
Netherlands  1,726   84.0     0.50  13.08 58.63 67.26    11.87 9.57    55.65  46.11 
Portugal  1,093   66.5     0.75  11.75  59.93  58.89   11.57  9.64   64.36  50.41 
Spain  482   41.9     0.76  15.12  62.41  55.32   11.59  7.91   62.27  53.18 
                        
Denmark  1,146   67.0     0.55  13.07  66.98  55.92   12.97  10.33   57.79  23.29 
Sweden  854   54.4     1.03  14.24  72.31  62.30   17.78  17.93   35.92  66.67 
UK  376   34.5     0.75  16.75  69.26  42.93   14.07  8.80   58.14  46.57   
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Table 2.5 cont. 
Cyprus  1,365   69.4     0.21  3.51  71.04  61.27   13.30  10.22   58.15  82.14 
Czech Rep.  1,103   64.0     1.29  24.71 47.61 62.59    11.90 11.57    40.10  64.74 
Estonia   3,887   98.6     2.02  24.34  62.02  49.17   11.47  11.07   73.25  57.21 
Hungary  795   52.7     1.89  24.92  74.69  55.98   12.21  11.17   61.32  59.74 
Latvia  1,021   62.4     1.15  22.81  54.08  57.40   11.10  10.26   55.58  64.77 
Lithuania  1,854   78.9     0.94  15.95  64.14  66.89   11.42  8.64   65.43  63.83 
Malta   2,015   78.7     1.07  10.15  64.53  37.05   21.27  22.58   39.62  42.40 
Poland   692    50.2     1.32  16.54 56.49 65.04    15.59 15.34    47.92  68.14 
Slovak Rep.   1,154    66.5     0.62 11.47 59.36 63.46    11.11 7.75    55.45  60.99 
Slovenia   1,425    64.1     0.64  15.81 65.24 60.10    10.82 8.63    61.26  28.77 
                       
Eurozone   966    52.9     0.57  11.70 57.41 60.47    12.93 10.10    50.03  43.94 
EU-15   931    52.7     0.61  12.29  59.83  59.12   13.33  10.55   50.14  44.26 
NMS   1,531    68.6     1.12  17.02  61.92  57.90   13.02  11.72   55.81  59.27 
EU-25   1,171    59.0     0.81  14.19  60.67  58.63   13.21  11.02   52.41  50.26 
Note: Regional averages are own calculations and unweighted averages. 
Source: For concentration, Table 3 in the Annex of ECB (2005a) and for all other measures, Table 16 in the Statistical Annex of ECB (2005b) representing all 
banks.  
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The European Commission (2006b) provides a more specific analysis 
regarding the concentration of retail  banking markets based on current 
account income and deposits, and finds the following CR5 ratios (the asset 
share of the five largest banks) for 2004: 53% to 58% for the EU overall, 53% 
to 57% for the EU-15 and a somewhat higher 62% to 64% for the NMS. 
These retail concentration levels are roughly similar to the concentration 
levels of the regional banking markets. For specific countries, overall versus 
retail concentration levels appear to differ. Given these differences, we can 
only generally conclude that the European integration project has not (yet) 
led to a uniform concentration level of national banking markets.  
Furthermore, the national retail concentration ratios might disguise 
differences in regional – e.g. within-country – concentration levels. Figure 
2.13 explores just these differences based on a CR5 proxy for current 
accounts.  
Figure 2.13 Concentration levels in the retail banking market 
Panel A: National concentration levels 
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Panel B: Regional concentration levels 
 
Notes: Concentration ratios are based on current accounts. Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta and 
Estonia are excluded. 
Source: See Figures 12 and 14 in European Commission (2006b). 
 
Differences are notably pronounced for the German retail banking market, 
which shows low concentration on a national level but high concentration 
on a regional within-country level – most likely owing to the prominence of 
savings and cooperative banks, which have a regional monopoly but joint 
national activities. Given the localised nature of retail banking, these 
regional concentration measures clearly paint a more accurate picture of 
the market structure.  
Although not indicative of the underlying causes of dynamics of retail 
banking efficiency, the banks’ financial statements give a distinct 52 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
impression of the current efficiency as well as the profitability of banks. 
Table 2.6 shows that retail banking markets still differ substantially 
between the EU-15 and the NMS. Whereas in the EU-15 banks generate 
most of their consumer income from mortgages, current accounts provide 
the leading share of income in the NMS. Likewise, for the SME retail 
banking sector, current accounts are the dominant income source for banks 
in the NMS providing 63.91% of gross income. In comparison, for banks in 
the EU-15, 78.22% of gross income is generated by SME current accounts 
and term loans combined. Overall profits and costs as a percentage of 
income have become similar over the three-year period from 2002 to 2004 
and now amount to just less than 30% for profits and between 62% and 66% 
for costs, respectively. 
Table 2.6 The structure of the European retail banking sector 
Panel A: Gross income share by consumer product line in 2004 
 
Current 
accounts (%) 
Deposits & 
savings (%) 
Consumer 
loans (%) 
Mortgages 
(%) 
Credit 
cards(%) 
EU 27.87  17.16  17.66  30.06 7.25 
  EU-15  26.50  15.94  17.05  32.85 7.66 
  NMS  34.95  23.45  20.85  15.62 5.13 
Panel B: Gross income share by SME product line in 2004  
 
Current 
accounts (%) 
Term loans 
(%) 
Credit lines 
(%) 
Leasing 
(%)    
EU 42.03  37.82  15.96  4.20  
  EU-15  37.79  40.43  17.17  4.61  
  NMS  63.91  24.30  9.72  2.07  
Panel C: Profits before tax as a % of total retail income  
 2002  2003  2004       
EU 21.60  24.50  28.80    
  EU-15  23.30  25.10  28.90    
  NMS  12.40  21.00  28.30       
Panel D: Operating costs as a % of total retail income  
 2002  2003  2004       
EU 65.80  66.20  62.60    
  EU-15  64.20  65.90  65.80    
  NMS  74.10  67.70  62.20       
Note: Regional averages are based on country-level averages weighted by population. 
Sources: Panel A is based on Table 16, Panel B on Table 17, Panel C on Table 22 and Panel D 
on Table 24 in European Commission (2006b). INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 53 
 
For the banking market as a whole, Table 2.6 provides an insight as to 
whether banks in highly concentrated markets are more profitable or 
efficient than are banks in less concentrated markets. It appears that in 
more concentrated markets, banks earn higher return on assets and return 
on equity while providing more loans and deposits (relative to their asset 
size) to customers. The other characteristics do not seem to be related to 
concentration in a clear way. For retail banking markets, the European 
Commission (2006b) conducts more specific regression analyses regarding 
the relationship between market conditions and financial performance – i.e. 
the relationship between bank size or market share on the one hand and 
profitability or cost-to-income ratios on the other. They find a small and 
significant positive relationship between banks’ market share and 
profitability, which is in line with our interpretation for the whole banking 
market. All other relationships – except a small negative relationship 
between bank size and cost-income ratio indicating limited economies of 
scale in retail banking – are generally weak. 
So far, we have investigated competitive behaviour from the banks’ 
perspective. Another important structural element is customer behaviour. 
In particular, the mobility of customers can enhance the competitive nature 
of a market. A low degree of mobility either could suggest that customers 
are generally satisfied with their bank or could signal the existence of high 
switching costs. Barriers to switching can affect the retail banking market in 
different ways:  
It can lead to more market power for banks, for example when banks 
charge higher prices to new customers and reward repeat customers with 
lower prices.  
It can pose a barrier to entry for other banks as the latter have to 
compensate customers for their switching costs and hence might find the 
new market unattractive. Or as new entrants cannot enter the market with 
only a few products, they would be compelled to go for a more complete 
and thus risky full-product entry strategy.  
It can discourage product innovation, as customers are slow to switch to 
banks that offer new products.  
Table 2.7 reveals rather limited customer mobility. The average age of a 
current account in the EU is about 10 years for consumer accounts and 8 
years for those of SMEs. Consequently, the churn – the proportion of 54 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
customers who change banks every year – is also rather low with 7.78% for 
consumers and 12.63% for SMEs. The higher churn for SMEs could simply 
be driven by the shorter lifespan of SMEs or could alternatively indicate 
that SMEs are more mobile and put more effort into finding the right bank. 
There are also clear national differences. Hungary has the highest churn 
rates with 10.41% and 17.59% for consumers and SMEs, respectively, 
compared with Greece with 2.36% for consumers and Lithuania with 3.34% 
for SMEs. On average, the NMS tend to have higher churn rates than the 
EU-15, which is partly driven by the number of new banking relationships.  
Table 2.7 Customer mobility in the European retail banking market 
 
Churn (adjusted for 
customer growth) 
(%)   
Average age of the 
current account 
 (in years) 
  Consumers  SMEs     Consumers  SMEs 
Austria 6.57  10.42    11.64  8.42 
Belgium 5.27  8.90    10.04  9.99 
Cyprus 10.33  13.00    6.65  4.63 
Czech Republic  8.61  10.70    7.91  7.87 
Denmark 10.02  15.43    12.06  9.75 
Finland 4.23  6.27    17.44  13.98 
France 6.84  12.26    11.06  8.39 
Germany 8.46  15.15    11.55  9.85 
Greece 2.36  3.55    4.34  5.23 
Hungary 10.41  17.59    6.26  4.29 
Ireland 5.44  6.95    8.13  10.14 
Italy 7.68  11.23    9.39  8.23 
Latvia 6.74  7.13    3.11  4.81 
Lithuania 7.73  3.34    6.23  4.46 
Luxembourg 6.46  11.29    7.2  6.45 
Malta 5.39  6.49    8.83  6.64 
Netherlands 4.17  8.88    14.33  10.45 
Poland 9.11  17.00    6.18  4.04 
Portugal 11.88  14.34    11.21  8.87 
Slovak Republic  10.81  15.80    4.49  5.54 
Slovenia 5.97  10.89    7.02  3.06 INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 55 
 
Table 2.7, cont. 
Spain 12.12  10.34    6.91  6.02 
Sweden 5.62  8.80    11.82  12.33 
UK 5.07  13.72    10.66  7.66 
           
EU 7.78  12.63    9.74  7.93 
  EU-15  7.55  12.21    10.40  8.56 
  NMS  9.02  14.82    6.28  4.67 
Notes: Churn is given for 2005 and is obtained from Table 36 in European Commission 
(2006b), which is defined as (new current accounts + closed current accounts) / (2 * number 
of current accounts beginning of the year). To adjust for customer growth, the absolute 
value of the country-level rate of growth of current accounts divided by 2 is deducted from 
the original churn value. The age of the current account is obtained from Table 37 (from the 
same source). Regional averages are based on country-level averages weighted by 
population. No data are available for Estonia. 
Source: European Commission (2006b). 
 
The overall low mobility in the retail banking market could simply indicate 
that customers are generally satisfied with their bank – and survey 
evidence reflects as much. Simultaneously, these surveys have shown that 
consumers cannot easily switch banks and experience difficulties 
regardless of whether they are satisfied with their bank. Low customer 
mobility may very well point to the presence of high switching costs or 
could be related to administrative burdens, information asymmetries and 
low price transparency, cross-selling and the bundling of banking products, 
customer preferences and choices, or closing charges. Evidence for all these 
factors exists as discussed in Box 2.1. 
In retail banking markets where customers switch more frequently, 
competition among banks will be higher. Thus, a negative relationship 
between mobility and the indicators of competition (profitability or 
concentration) can be expected. The European Commission (2006b, p. 115) 
indeed finds that customers in more concentrated and more profitable 
markets are less mobile, but it shies away from the conclusion that “low 
mobility indicators signal that highly profitable and concentrated markets 
in Europe are solely the result of a lack of competition”. 
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Box 2.1 Switching costs as a cause of low customer mobility 
Administrative burdens 
Whereas only 20% of all customers find it difficult to switch banks, this 
percentage increases to 75% for those customers who are dissatisfied with their 
bank. 
Price transparency  
Banks tend to set prices for either account management or payments (or both). 
This tactic differs across countries and time, leading to low price transparency 
and making cross-border price competition difficult. A substantial fraction 
(59%) of consumers report that they find it difficult to understand the financial 
information provided by banks and 54% find that they cannot easily compare 
the information of different banks. 
Information asymmetries 
As banks learn about the credit quality of their customers over time, a longer 
banking relationship is beneficial for the customer. This tie reduces switching. 
Furthermore, switching to foreign bank lenders is made more difficult as most 
credit registers are national. 
Cross-selling and bundling of products 
Consumers typically buy more than one product from a bank. The most 
prominent ‘hook-on’ product is a mortgage. In the EU-25 as a whole, 
consumers who obtain a mortgage also obtain 2.97 products from the same 
bank. For current accounts and deposit accounts as hook-on products the ratio 
is somewhat lower with 2.14 and 1.81 products, respectively. Correspondingly, 
SMEs who obtain a credit line/overdraft, a loan or a current account buy 3.03, 
2.81 and 2.02 products from the same bank, respectively. Differences across 
countries are substantial. In general, however, consumers and SMEs in the EU-
15 buy more products from their banks than their counterparts do in the NMS.  
Customer preferences and choices 
It appears that because of the complex nature of banking products and the 
difficulty customers have in understanding these products, customers prefer a 
locally present bank (in contrast to distance banking through the Internet, 
telephone, etc.). Factors such as proximity to home or work, family history 
with a bank, trust and service quality are important determinants for 
customers when choosing their bank.  
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Box 2.1, cont. 
Closing charges 
Until very recently, closing charges and early repayment fees existed in most 
EU countries and could be substantial. For example, whereas most countries 
do not charge for closing a current account, where such fees are applied they 
can amount to as much as €60 in Italy but are more commonly limited to no 
more than €15 in Belgium, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
Source: European Commission (2006b). 
 
In sum, the evidence points to limitations in competition and the existence 
of barriers to entry. Yet, these market characteristics differ not only across 
countries but also across regions within countries. Consequently, market 
entry and competition will remain fundamental to achieving growth-
enhancing, efficient banking markets in the EU. 
2.4.2  Intermediation margins and the importance of global bench-
marking 
While the findings of the previous competition analyses inform us about 
the state and development of competition they can also be complemented 
by a time-series analysis of intermediation margins, which are also – 
although arguably rather rough – indicators of competition. The analysis of 
margins has the advantage that their convergence can be interpreted as a 
sign of integration and their reduction as a sign of competition (Cabral et 
al., 2002; Baele et al., 2004). That being said, an analysis for the EU alone is 
not sufficient. Competition does not arise solely from within the EU but is 
also a global phenomenon. As financial markets are developing and 
integrating on a global scale, benchmarking is therefore important 
(otherwise, as noted above, the impact of changes in the global banking 
business induced by technological and financial innovation along with 
general deregulation could be mistaken for a success or failure of regional 
integration policies). Global benchmarking is necessary and can easily be 
done for a time series of intermediation margins. In Kleimeier & Sander 
(2006), we advocate a difference-in-differences (DD) approach to 
intermediation margin analysis, which avoids the mistake of over-
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convergence that can truly be attributed to European integration efforts 
rather than to part of a global integration process.  
We conduct the analysis for just mortgages and corporate loans as globally 
comparable series are only available for these two rates. Figure 2.14 shows 
the margins and reveals three features:  
Globally as well as in the eurozone, mortgage margins are smaller than are 
corporate loan margins.  
Global mortgage margins do not appear to converge much. Yet in the 
eurozone, convergence can be observed until the introduction of the single 
currency.  
For corporate loan margins there is again no clear indication of global 
convergence but these margins appear to have a smaller spread/variation 
than do eurozone margins.  
Note, however, that there are basically three outliers in the eurozone: 
Belgium, Germany and Ireland. Without them, the remaining eurozone can 
be considered a convergence club where margins are relatively close 
together and convergence can again be found before the monetary union. 
Figure 2.14 Interest rate margins 
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Panel B: Non-eurozone mortgages 
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Panel D: Non-eurozone corporate loans 
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Notes: The eurozone contains Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The non-eurozone contains Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US. Margins are given as a percentage per annum and are 
calculated based on 3-month money market rates for corporate loans and 10-year 
government bonds for mortgages. 
Source: Figure 1 in Kleimeier & Sander (2006). 
 
Figure 2.15 illustrates the results of the DD analysis. σ-convergence 
measures whether or not interest rates have become more similar over time 
when compared with each other or with a benchmark rate. In contrast, β-
convergence highlights the speed with which national interest rates 
converge. It implies – again very much in the sense of the Cecchini report – 
that countries with initially relatively high interest-rate margins should 
show faster downward adjustment than countries with already low 
margins. Regarding mortgage margins, the analysis reveals that σ-
convergence was much stronger outside than inside the eurozone in the 
pre-EMU period. As such, no eurozone-specific σ-convergence can be 
found. Nevertheless, the β-convergence results for eurozone mortgage 
margins reveal a convergence process that was present over the whole 
investigation period, which even increased during the EMU period. Still, 
non-eurozone β-convergence was about twice as high. Thus compared with 
a global benchmark, eurozone mortgage margins exhibit relatively less β-INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 61 
 
convergence. This result might therefore indicate that the convergence of 
margins is not so much driven by eurozone-specific processes such as 
measures to promote a single banking market, but by a global process of 
financial innovation and competition. Regarding corporate loan margins, 
the results reveal eurozone-specific σ- and β-convergence only during the 
pre-EMU period. Since the graphical picture in Figure 2.1 reveals the 
existence of a convergence club for corporate loans, we also conduct the 
analysis for a restricted eurozone excluding Germany, Belgium and 
Ireland. Interestingly, for these countries, corporate rate margins have 
continued to converge under the single currency. Hence, the results from 
the DD analysis are somewhat in line with the evidence from quantity-
based measures of integration, which paint a more pessimistic picture of 
the state of retail banking integration in Europe than do reports of simple 
interest rate convergence. The results should in turn remind us that 
improvements in the efficiency of banking intermediation cannot readily be 
attributed to regional integration policies.  
Figure 2.15 Benchmarking margin convergence in the eurozone against margin 
convergence at the global level 
Panel A: σ-convergence 
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Mortgages in
pre-EMU period
Mortgages in
EMU period
Short-term loans
to enterprises in
pre-EMU period
Short-term loans
to enterprises in
EMU period
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
g
e
n
c
e
Global
Eurozone
Eurozone specific
 62 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
Panel B: β-convergence 
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Notes: Bars in the negative regions indicate convergence whereas bars in the positive region 
indicate divergence. The black and hatched bars represent the total convergence in two 
regions, respectively and independently: global convergence and eurozone convergence. 
Based on these two measures, eurozone-specific convergence is now defined as eurozone 
convergence minus global convergence. Thus, if there is more convergence globally than in 
the eurozone (e.g. when the black bar is more negative than the hatched bar), then 
eurozone-specific divergence (e.g. a positive grey bar) is found. In contrast, if there is less 
convergence globally than in the eurozone (e.g. when the black bar is less negative than the 
hatched bar), then eurozone-specific convergence (e.g. a negative grey bar) is found. 
Source: Based on data provided in Table 1 of Kleimeier & Sander (2006).  
2.4.3 Interest  rate  pass-through:  Monetary transmission, competition 
and integration 
Pass-through studies are increasingly employed for assessing integration in 
the retail banking market. The underlying idea is as follows: if retail 
banking interest rates closely follow changes in monetary policy or market 
interest rates (or both), this will substitute for cross-border arbitrage as the 
national retail interest rates in the eurozone are then tied together. This 
pass-through under the condition of monetary integration produces the 
statistical artefact of evidence for or against integration. Moreover, in the 
presence of an integrated wholesale market, such as in the EMU, this INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 63 
 
would signal a competitive retail banking market. Conversely, a limited 
pass-through of interest rates might point to a high degree of imperfect 
competition in retail banking (Cottarelli & Kourelis, 1994). And if the pass-
through process is heterogeneous across countries, this could be 
interpreted as a limited institutional convergence process in European 
retail banking, which works against the LOOP.13  It is in this sense that 
throughout Europe a more competitive banking market could contribute to 
a smooth and more homogenous monetary transmission. 
The results of pass-through studies typically indicate considerable 
differences in the pass-through not only across bank lending and deposit 
rates but also across the countries of the eurozone. Furthermore, a 
substantial degree of short-term bank interest-rate stickiness is found. At 
the same time, many but not all studies find evidence of a less than full 
pass-through in the long term, which can be read as evidence of credit 
rationing phenomena. In addition, asymmetric adjustment of retail interest 
rates depending on the type of interest rate shock is regularly documented. 
Finally, it is often argued that the single currency could act as a unifying 
force that has the potential to make the pass-through faster, more complete 
and more homogeneous. One question addressed by an earlier pass-
through study (Sander & Kleimeier, 2004) is particularly relevant in the 
context of market integration: To what extent has the response of retail 
interest rates to monetary policy rates become more similar across 
countries, i.e. under the single currency? Figure 2.16 presents a visual 
answer, which generally supports the no-no-and-maybe proposition 
obtained from the cointegration analyses of mortgage, consumer lending 
and short-term corporate lending markets: mortgage and consumer lending 
rates show a highly heterogeneous response to monetary policy.  
                                                 
13 The methodological details regarding pass-through analyses are presented in 
Box A3 in the Appendix. Most studies on eurozone pass-through are based on a 
variant of the pioneering work by Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994). Important 
contributions include BIS (1994), Cottarelli et al. (1995), Borio & Fritz (1995), Mojon 
(2001), de Bondt (2002), de Bondt et al. (2002), Sander & Kleimeier (2002), Toolsema 
et al. (2002) and Heinemann & Schüler (2003). Note that some pass-through studies 
select as the common factor those market interest rates that are most closely related 
to the retail interest rate under investigation (de Bondt, 2002; de Bondt et al., 2002; 
Baele et al., 2004). Other studies opt for a money market rate as the common 
(monetary policy) factor (Mojon, 2001; Heinemann & Schüler, 2003; Sander & 
Kleimeier, 2002, 2004; Toolsema et al., 2002).  64 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
Figure 2.16 Cross-country variations in the eurozone’s pass-through process 
 
Notes: Figure 2.16 represents the cross-country CV for pass-through multipliers based on a 
+1% change in the proxy for the monetary policy rate (money market rate). Grey (black) 
bars refer to the pre-break (post-break) period. 
Source: Adopted from Figure 2 in the LIFE working paper 03-009 version of Sander & 
Kleimeier (2004) (retrieved from http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/finance/workingpapers). 
 
For consumer lending rates, the response to monetary policy rates is, 
however, most heterogeneous and even shows indications of increasing 
heterogeneity. In line with the growing signs of a more integrated, short-
term corporate lending market, the pass-through is not only the fastest but 
also the most homogeneous one by far. Indeed, this homogeneity increases 
even further in the post-break period. Although improvements in the latter 
sense are also visible for longer-term corporate loans, the heterogeneity 
with respect to monetary policy impulses is still higher than it is for short-
term loans. The Sander & Kleimeier (2004) study also uses the results of 
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pass-through estimates in second-stage regressions to shed light on the role 
of competition and integration for a more uniform monetary transmission. 
For the eurozone, it is argued that the evidence points to a lack of 
integration and in particular to the role of legal and cultural differences that 
may continue to preclude full convergence in the near future even after the 
introduction of the single currency. 
With respect to the pass-through in the NMS, it is interesting to note that 
recent research (Opiela, 1999; Chmielewski, 2004; Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 
2004; Horváth et al., 2004; Sander & Kleimeier, 2005) has shown that the 
pass-through is typically faster, more complete and more uniform in these 
countries. Moreover, in Sander & Kleimeier (2005) it is shown that the 
differences in the pass-through, i.e. in the price stickiness of retail interest 
rates in these countries, can largely be explained by variables describing the 
state of competition and the relative importance of foreign bank 
participation in these countries. Country-specific legal or cultural 
differences appear to play no critical role. In other words, if these countries 
managed to achieve market structures that are more similar (i.e. 
competition) the pass-through might also converge. This result stands in 
sharp contrast to the results for the eurozone member countries, where 
initial market characteristics go a long way to prevent convergence and 
foreign participation on a large scale. An interesting implication of this 
analysis is that conditional upon 1) a convergence of market structures in 
the NMS and 2) joining the eurozone, which could equate policy and 
market interest rates, the pass-through and thus retail interest rates would 
become relatively homogenous across the NMS. 
2.4.4  Financial development and retail banking efficiency 
In an excellent survey of the changing character of European finance, Rajan 
& Zingales (2003) argue that there is a general trend in Europe towards 
bank disintermediation and a shift towards more ‘arm’s length’ 
transactions. The term ‘arm’s length’ refers to the transaction between two 
unrelated parties who only rely on publicly available information, such as 
in corporate bond markets. This kind of transaction is contrasted with 
relationship finance, such as banking intermediation, which often builds on 
long-term relationships. Both systems do have their own merits and 
problems, including limitations in the access to market-based, arm’s length 
finance for SMEs. According to Rajan & Zingales, relationship finance may 66 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
be better suited to financing physical capital investment while arm’s length 
finance is hypothesised to be superior in financing human capital and 
innovation-intensive firms. Although we do not want to go too much into 
this discussion here, a potential implication for retail banking integration 
warrants attention. Since arm’s length finance can both substitute and 
complement retail banking products, its development will have an 
important impact on the efficiency of retail banking. In a recent study for 
the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2006), a financial index was 
constructed to reflect the development of “traditional banking 
intermediation”, “new financial intermediation” and other, more general 
“financial market characteristics”. The authors argue that this index is 
related to features of financial service products. As reflected in Figure 2.17, 
they show that higher scores in the financial index are related to more 
attractive features of financial products in the mortgage market.  
Figure 2.17 Development of the banking market 
Panel A: Financial index in 1995 versus 2004 
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Panel B: Mortgage markets in 2004 
 
Notes: In Panel A, grey bars represent data for 1995 and black bars represent data for 2004. 
The index ranges from 0 to 1 with a higher value indicating more developed financial 
intermediation. In Panel B, grey bars represent countries in the upper half of the financial 
index (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and 
the US) whereas black bars represent countries in the lower half of the financial index 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Portugal and Spain). The y-
axis represents the percentage of countries where the mortgage market feature can be 
found. 
Source: Panel A represents Figure 4.5 and Panel B represents Figure 4.6 from IMF (2006). 
 
Also, and as we have argued and shown in this report, wholesale market 
integration has been a major driving force behind the observable, though 
yet limited integration process. For that reason, most integration effects 
were obtained in the eurozone in the phase leading up to monetary 
integration, which had a tremendous effect on wholesale market 
integration. A major lesson from the experience of the US is that this 
process can go further with additional wholesale market integration, 
especially with the emerging and quickly developing secondary credit 
markets and securitisation. We return to this issue in section 3.2. 
In sum it appears that integration in the retail banking market is not only 
largely driven by events in the wholesale banking market, but also by 
‘financial development’ in general. If this view is correct, it strongly argues 
in favour of an overall assessment of retail banking that should be placed within a 
framework of overall financial development, comprising movements in banking and 
market-based finance with a particular emphasis on the interaction of both.  
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3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
3.1  General policy considerations 
What policy implications can be drawn from the presented evidence? First, 
it is important that regulators take into account the natural limits to the 
integration of the retail banking market to avoid counter-productive over-
harmonisation, which may damage the efficient workings of national 
markets (Barros et al., 2005). That being said, further steps to reduce 
artificial and political barriers to entry and thus to integration need to be 
considered. Second, as the evidence shows that the scope of integration by 
means of cross-border M&As is limited – at least in the short run – a 
renewed focus on competition and competition policy is highly desirable. 
This focus should be on open markets, e.g. low barriers to market entry, 
market contestability, reduced switching costs for retail customers and 
transparency (e.g. fee structure) in order to develop a more efficient retail 
banking market. Third, it has been shown that the growth of an efficient 
and complementary arm’s length financial sector can provide substitute 
financial products and consequently a more competitive and efficient 
banking market in Europe. Fourth, the evidence points to the fundamental 
role of wholesale market integration in conjunction with a competitive 
environment for generating more retail market integration. This conclusion 
implies that more progress in the integration of the wholesale market might 
give a new impulse to that in the retail banking market. Two elements may 
be crucial here: 1) the development and implementation of a single 
European payment area (SEPA) and 2) the expansion of secondary loan 
markets and securitisation. Fifth, national supervision is often considered 
an obstacle to cross-border banking while at the same time more cross-
border banking may question the adequacy of national supervision. In the 
following sections we discuss in more detail the chances and risks of 
securitisation and the implications of integration for supervision. INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 69 
 
3.2 Securitisation 
If the integration process is to a large extent being driven by the wholesale 
market, financial market forces could provide additional impetus to retail 
banking integration. This is so because retail banking relies on geographic 
proximity to the customer, given that retail lending is characterised by 
substantial information asymmetries and local banks have a comparative 
advantage in screening local borrowers. In such an environment of 
segmented markets, diversification opportunities for the banks’ loan 
portfolios remain present as risk and return differ across national banking 
markets. A potentially powerful driver of increased integration could be 
the creation of a secondary market for loans, which has been a major force 
behind the integration of US mortgage markets. As recently noted by 
Fonteyne (2006, pp. 3–4),  
[W]hereas U.S. banks pass standardized risks on to the markets 
through securitisation and manage more profitable nonstandardized 
risks themselves, European banks keep the bulk of their assets on their 
books. They do so in part because capital markets are less developed, 
incomplete, or fragmented. Mortgage loans in the United States, for 
example, are mostly securitized (in mortgage-backed securities) and 
placed in a highly liquid market that attracts global investors. But in 
the EU, legal frameworks (and hence markets) for the securitisation of 
mortgage loans are country-specific, if they exist at all. These capital 
market constraints in turn hinder the integration of the retail-oriented 
banking markets and, more fundamentally, national economies. 
The European Central Bank (2002) has also suggested that securitisation 
might provide additional integration effects. Securitisation in Europe is 
currently increasing but with only €150 billion it is still underdeveloped 
when compared with the US.14 Therefore, a look at the effects that 
securitisation had on the US retail banking markets and here in particular 
on the mortgage markets can provide valuable lessons. 
                                                 
14 The legal and regulatory changes adopted during the 1990s, in particular the 
allowance of special purpose vehicles and financial vehicle corporations, were 
crucial in fostering the creation of many new financial instruments. This 
development has contributed to the growth of securitisation especially in Belgium, 
Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, national patterns prevail and differences include 
the type of debt that is securitised (household versus corporate debt), the maturity 
of the created securities (short- versus long-term) and the relative quantities of 
securitised debt. 70 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
In the US, securitisation first occurred in the mortgage market in the 1970s. 
A second wave took place in 1980s, which also marked the establishment of 
the Government National Mortgage Association, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 
Together these agencies took on a leading role in the development. Private 
securitising firms have joined the market and securitisation has been 
steadily rising. Although only 5% of consumer loans were securitised in 
1989, this percentage had risen to 30% in 2000. Major types of securitised 
loans now include student, manufactured housing, home equity, credit 
card and auto loans. Securitisation is still most pronounced in the mortgage 
market, however, where 46% of all mortgages were securitised in 2000 
(Estrella, 2002).  
Two main types of benefits from mortgage securitisation have been 
advocated for the US and could hence eventually be expected in Europe: 
first, benefits from the deepening of the mortgage market; and second, 
benefits from the broadening of the mortgage market. Regarding the first 
benefit, it appears that increased securitisation is correlated with lower 
interest rate spreads on mortgages. Kolari et al. (1998, p. 679) find that “a 
10% increase in the level of securitization as a proportion of total mortgage 
originations reduces the yield spread on home mortgage loans by as much 
as 20 basis points in the long run”. Yet, some authors question the causality 
pattern and argue that low spreads may have led to more securitisation.15  
Regarding the second benefit, Katz (1997) argues that cross-sectional 
dispersion in mortgage rates in the US is negatively related to 
securitisation. Whereas regional mortgage rates differed by 100 basis points 
or more, they have become much more homogeneous. She believes that 
banks in the US use securitisation to reduce their sensitivity to local 
economic shocks. Owing to their superior knowledge of market conditions, 
property values and the creditworthiness of borrowers, banks still 
concentrate their loan origination in specific regions or industries. These 
loans do not stay on the balance sheet, however, but are securitised and 
sold to banks anywhere in the country. As a result, “[m]oney can flow from 
regions with idle deposits to those with excess loan demand, and thus 
mortgage rates are more similar across the country”. 
                                                 
15 See e.g. Estrella (2002), who argues on the basis of a study by Heuson et al. (2001) 
that low mortgage rates cause more securitisation. As such, the negation 
correlation might not necessarily have to be interpreted as consumer benefits. INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 71 
 
This US evidence implies that increasing securitisation may help to 
generate the yet elusive Cecchini benefits and could eventually lead to 
more convergence of retail lending rates in a market where banks and bank 
lending remain domestic in nature. Still, as noted previously, the first effect 
is disputed and might require further research. Moreover, eventual benefits 
would have to be weighted against potential costs. For example, 
securitisation is believed to affect the stability of the banking sector. While 
on the one hand, stability is increased as banks can hold more diversified 
portfolios and are less dependent on the local economy (Katz, 1997), 
stability is on the other hand decreased if securitisation is used for 
regulatory capital arbitrage (Jones, 2000) or leads to the insufficient 
monitoring of borrowers.16 These risks have become clearly visible in mid-
2007, as concerns about the potentially widespread default of securitised 
sub-prime US loans and reduced liquidity in the interbank markets have 
reached such an extent that central banks have decided to inject substantial 
amounts of liquidity into the market.  
Finally, securitisation can have an impact on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy transmission, notably with respect to the pass-through mechanism. 
Estrella (2002) finds a stronger effect of monetary policy on mortgage rates 
as a result of increased securitisation. But as securitisation allows banks to 
continue their lending activities even under monetary tightening because 
securitised loans do not need to be funded by deposits, monetary policy 
seems to have very little effect on output. Kuttner (2000) provides empirical 
evidence that banks do indeed use securitisation as a monetary policy 
buffer. He finds that in their reaction to monetary policy, securitisation 
volume moves in the opposite direction to bank loan volume. Accordingly, 
consumers might benefit as credit crunches are avoided. At the same time, 
the impact of securitisation on the protection of consumers is an additional 
issue that requires regulatory scrutiny. 
In sum, while securitisation can bring tremendous benefits in terms of 
integrating markets and making markets more competitive, there can be 
enormous downside risks in terms of financial stability that strongly 
suggest the need for appropriate financial regulation and supervision. 
                                                 
16 Lisieri et al. (2001) report evidence of a free-rider problem in UK mortgage 
markets in the 1980s. 72 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
3.3  Ownership and supervision 
The recent wave of M&As in European banking has prompted concern 
about the adequacy of the present national supervision among both 
academics and policy-makers. Furthermore, the model of Societas 
Europaea and the related trend towards cross-border branching requires 
specific regulatory attention. In this respect, Dermine (2006, p. 57) warns 
against putting “the cart before the horse”, i.e. he urges solving the 
regulatory issues of who will supervise and who will provide deposit 
insurance now and not after an integrated market has already emerged. He 
argues that the ‘home-country’ principle, which in the past was functional 
in promoting banking market integration, may not be the first-best solution 
in the future for guaranteeing both the efficiency and stability of an 
integrated European banking market. 
Consequently, many observers maintain that the question of ownership lies 
“at the heart of debates about the integration of financial markets” (Barros 
et al., 2005, p. 4). According to this view, the elimination of barriers to trade 
will favour the least-cost supplier at the expense of the relatively less 
efficient one. Thus, as always in international trade, the more efficient 
foreign supplier will eventually replace the local supplier. As banking is a 
service product, some cross-border activity is required. Given also that 
retail banking is a localised business, it is most likely that banks and not 
customers will cross borders. Barros et al. (2005) point to two consequences 
of foreign ownership with respect to retail banking. First, foreign banks and 
their respective national supervisors under the principle of home-country 
supervision may be more concerned with the situation at home than in the 
host country. This tendency may become important in the case of adverse 
shocks. While it would not be so much of a problem if foreign banks come 
from a country that belongs to the same monetary system, it is a concern if 
banks come from a different monetary system. These latter banks, their 
regulators and monetary authorities may pay more attention to the home-
country situation than to preserving activities in host countries. Financial 
stability in the host country could in turn be affected. Second, as 
relationship banking is a common feature in many Continental European 
countries, the authors also argue that an expanded foreign presence may 
favour transaction banking at the expense of relationship banking. 
If integration were therefore driven by a substantial increase in cross-
border banking and cross-border M&As, the issue of supervision would INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 73 
 
come to the fore. The question emerges as to whether one can 
simultaneously preserve 1) a stable financial system in the presence of 2) 
financial integration and still preserve 3) national financial supervision. 
Schoenmaker (2005, p. 399) holds that there exists a “trilemma of financial 
supervision” that allows the pursuit of only two of these three incompatible 
objectives at the same time (see Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1 The trilemma of financial supervision: Choose two and only two 
1. Stable financial system 
 
2. Integrated financial market    3. National financial supervision 
 
Source: Schoenmaker (2005, p. 399). 
We do not aim here at discussing the pros and cons of national financial 
supervision, which have been debated extensively in the literature. Rather, 
our point is that the trilemma is a concern that national policy-makers have 
to face when banking market integration is predominantly achieved by 
cross-border M&As, cross-border branching, Societas Europaea, etc. If, 
however, the effects of integration are achieved by a combination of 
wholesale integration, low entry barriers and hence contestable and 
competitive markets, banking markets can essentially remain national as 
far as ownership is concerned, because the incentive to enter a highly 
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Thus, in principle a pro-competitive policy can prolong the half-life of 
national supervision, while national attempts to protect the national 
financial industry may ultimately undermine it. Yet given that in practice 
national and local banks often possess almost natural competitive 
advantages, one should not take this argument too far, especially when 
bank customer mobility is rather low (see section 2.4.1). In this respect, one 
additional asymmetry deserves attention. Whereas in countries with highly 
developed financial systems national banks clearly have competitive 
advantages, this is not true for the NMS as can be witnessed by the high 
degree of foreign bank penetration in these countries. As a result, the 
trilemma options may be viewed quite differently by policy-makers across 
the NMS, the EU-15 and within the eurozone. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Integration in the European retail banking market is still far from perfect 
and may never become perfect. Particularly retail services, such as 
relationship lending to small businesses, might always be provided by local 
banks that best understand the local market, language and culture, and 
which have superior information about local businesses. In the new EU 
member states the situation is completely different, as no competitive 
national banking system was present at the time when the transition 
started. Thus, foreign bank participation became a vital part of the financial 
sector’s transformation process. Keeping in mind these differences, several 
conclusions emerge from the review of the academic evidence: 
1)  It is important to understand and correctly identify the economic 
limits of integration in retail banking to avoid ‘over-harmonisation’. 
2)  Integration has been strongest where markets are most competitive 
and the least plagued by imperfections. In this sense, among the 
lending markets corporate lending (where competition is stronger) is 
the most integrated, followed by mortgages (where collateral reduces 
asymmetric information problems); consumer credit is the least 
integrated market. On the deposit side, time deposit markets, where 
switching costs are less significant, are the most integrated ones, 
while current account markets appear to be the least integrated. 
3)  As most integration took place in the 1990s, the process was largely 
driven by the earlier integration of wholesale financial markets and 
by means of the introduction of the single currency. Since wholesale 
integration has largely been accomplished, the integration process in 
retail banking seems to have lost momentum – at least until very 
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4)  As a result, the still-segmented retail markets provide diversification 
opportunities for banks’ loan portfolios as risk and return differ 
across national banking markets. This may explain the recent increase 
in cross-border banking. Some larger mergers have taken place and 
more are expected to follow. The model of Societas Europaea and the 
related trend towards cross-border branching requires particular 
regulatory attention and puts the principle of home-country 
supervision under increasing pressure. Yet it remains to be seen how 
far this process of internationalisation by cross-border banking will 
go. Two reasons can be mentioned: 
a)  The elusive evidence in favour of economies of scale in retail 
banking may limit the extent of cross-border banking unless 
banking products become more commodity-like.  
b)  Given the evidence of the competitive advantages of home-
country banks, the potential of integration through cross-border 
banking may be further limited – at least for countries with 
competitive national banking systems. In the new member states 
the situation is different and foreign banks play a much larger 
role in integrating banking markets. Accordingly, the regulatory 
challenges are much more pressing in these countries. 
5)  Because of the tremendous divergences in real retail interest rates, 
which are at least partly the result of substantial inflation 
differentials, the relation between product prices in retail banking and 
other product prices warrants attention, as successful price reduction 
in product markets can lead to increases in real retail interest rates. As 
such an integrated approach to all segments of the single market is 
called for. 
6)  Consequently, competition in retail banking also deserves special 
attention. As the emphasis on economies of scale as expressed in the 
single market project now appears to many observers as over-
excessive, recently the role of open markets and market entry has 
rightly been highlighted (Sapir et al., 2004; Delgado, 2006). It is also in 
this respect that the openness of markets may not simply mean 
openness towards European markets. A broad-based analysis of 
competitive forces and market contestability on a regional and global 
scale, with proper benchmarking determining which effects can be 
attributed to regional policies, could be very helpful for achieving this 
objective. INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 77 
 
7)  Integrating wholesale markets in conjunction with developing and 
preserving competitive banking markets are fundamental to 
‘produce’ integrated market effects. Two mechanisms are the most 
relevant: the transmission of monetary impulses onto retail bank 
(lending) interest rates and well-functioning capital markets. 
Regarding the first mechanism, competition and competition policy in 
national markets remain highly significant issues, as price stickiness is 
a major feature of European retail banking. As the pass-through 
becomes faster and more homogeneous across countries, it will create 
a de facto integrated market. The same is true with respect to the 
second issue, particularly regarding the emerging and fast-
developing secondary credit markets. Also in this area, European 
financial regulation and supervision will have to play an increasingly 
prominent role in the future. 
8)  As competition-cum-wholesale integration is essential to ‘producing’ 
integration effects it can substitute for cross-border banking. In turn, 
the more effective this channel of integration becomes the less cross-
border banking will be induced or needed to create a single market 
and the less pressing is the need to reconsider the current system of 
national regulation. Or to put it the other way around, the less 
competitive national banking markets are, the more they will attract 
foreign bank entrants and the more the system of national regulation 
and supervision will come under pressure. 
9)  Finally, integration of the retail banking market is ultimately a means 
to achieve a competitive and growth-enhancing financial system in 
Europe. In this respect, retail banking is a part, but not the only part 
of the story. On the one hand, the emergence of other financial 
markets, especially arm’s length finance, complements traditional 
banking. On the other hand, these developments bring important 
accompaniments (such as secondary markets) and competitive 
pressure to retail banking. Together they call for joint monitoring of 
both retail banking and its interaction with the development and the 
stability of the whole financial system. 
In sum, retail banking is still fragmented. Yet the traditional approach of 
relying mainly on economies of scale and integration through single market 
harmonisation and cross-border banking may have run into diminishing 
returns by now. A new emphasis on market entry and competition as well 
as on the interaction of the retail banking market with a broad-based 78 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
 
concept of financial market development is important and is increasingly 
being advocated in the academic literature. The creation of an integrated 
European financial market requires that both retail and capital markets 
advance jointly. A broad-based perspective on financial market 
development with a strong eye on competition in retail banking without 
compromising financial stability may thus be most the functional in terms 
of the growth benefits for an integrated Europe. 
Of course, these benefits may also come with repercussions that may 
warrant additional attention, such as financial stability issues and a 
distributional impact within societies. While these issues are beyond the 
limits of this report, the existing evidence on the growth-enhancing effects 
of an efficient financial system should convince policy-makers that Europe 
could gain tremendously by giving high priority to financial sector 
development on Europe’s future economic policy agenda.  
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APPENDIX 
Box A1. Convergence methodology 
To analyse convergence in its simplest form, the following two regressions for 
σ- and β-convergence can be estimated: 
SDt = a1 + b1 T + εt     (1.1) 
Δzc,r,t+12 = d1 zc,r,t + εc,r,t  (1.2) 
In equation (1.1) T indicates a trend. In equation (1.2) zc,r,t is defined as the 
difference in month t between the retail interest rate of country c and the 
average retail interest rate or margin in region r to which country c belongs. 
The change in this deviation is measured by Δzc,r,t+12= zc,r,t+12 – zc,r,t. Δzc,r,t+12 
indicates the change over the coming 12 months.  
To investigate whether convergence continued or even increased under 
the single currency, dummies can be included in the σ- and β-convergence 
regressions respectively, such that  
SDt = a1 + a2 DEMU + b1 T + b2 T DEMU + εt  (1.3) 
Δzc,r,t+12 = d1 zc,r,t + d2 zc,r,t DEMU + εc,r,t  (1.4) 
where DEMU is the dummy equal to 1 for observations t during the EMU 
period. A negative b2 or d2 coefficient indicates additional convergence during 
the EMU period. 
To benchmark the convergence process in the eurozone against global 
trends, a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis is employed based on the 
following panel regressions:  
SDr,t = a1 + a2 DEMU + a3 Dr + a4 Dr,EMU + b1 T + b2 T DEMU + b3 T Dr + b4 T Dr,EMU 
+ εr,EMU,t  (1.5) 
Δzc,r,t+12 = d1 zc,r,t + d 2 zc,r,t DEMU + d 3 zc,r,t Dr + d 4 zc,r,t Dr,EMU + εc,r,t  (1.6) 
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Box A1, cont.  
Two additional dummies are included: Dr is a cross-sectional dummy equal to 
1 if the dependent variable is measured for region r = eurozone. Dr,EMU is a 
compound dummy equal to 1 for region r = eurozone and for observations 
belonging to the EMU period. As such, SD and Δz are calculated for eurozone 
and non-eurozone countries separately. σ- and β-convergence can now be 
differentiated by region and period based on the estimated coefficients. 
 
Source: Sander & Kleimeier (2005). 
Box A2. Cointegration methodology 
To establish that there exists a certain long-term relationship – either bilateral 
between national interest rates or between national interest rates and the 
weighted average of the remaining eurozone countries, such as the one 
indicated in equation (2.3) – we have to undertake cointegration testing. 
Following Engle & Granger (1987), a setting where time series of individual 
variables “can wander extensively and yet some pairs of series may be 
expected to move so they do not drift too far apart” is best being studied in the 
context of a cointegration analysis. The reason for the need to use this 
methodology is that simple regression analyses of equations like (2) may lead 
to spurious results when time series such as interest rates follow a so-called 
‘random walk’. The underlying idea of cointegration is that such non-
stationary time series, however, can move apart in the short run, but will be 
brought back by market forces to an equilibrium relation in the long run. The 
cointegration methodology applied in this study closely follows the approach 
promoted by Engle & Granger (1987) and proceeds in three steps. First, the 
time series must be proven to be unit roots. Only then can the cointegration 
vector be estimated. Finally, once cointegration has been established, the 
corresponding error correction model can be estimated.  
To establish whether the interest rates are unit roots, or I(1), two test 
statistics, a t-statistic and an F-statistic, are employed based on regressions on 
levels as well as first differences of the underlying series. Next to lagged 
observations of the lending rate L in question both also include a trend variable 
T: 
 
 INTEGRATING EUROPE’S RETAIL BANKING MARKET | 89 
 
Box A2, cont. 
ΔLt = η0 + η1 Lt-1 + η2 ΔLt-1 + η3 T + εt    (2.1) 
Δ2Lt = η0 + η1 ΔLt-1 + η2 Δ2Lt-1  + η3 T + εt  (2.2) 
The null hypothesis states that the series follow random walks. For the t-
statistic, this corresponds to a null hypothesis of H0: η1 = 0 and for the F-
statistic to a null hypothesis of H0:  η1 = η3 = 0.We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of a random walk if the calculated t or F values are smaller in 
absolute terms than the critical values. Thus, as a precondition for 
cointegration, we have to accept the null hypotheses for equation (2.1) but 
reject them for equation (2.2).  
Once the I(1) characteristic has been established, cointegration testing can 
commence. We start with estimating the cointegration regression using the 
national lending rate Lnat for the individual country as the dependent variable 
and the weighted average rate for the remaining eurozone countries LEU as the 
independent variable (or in the case of bilateral cointegration the national 
lending rate of another country Lnat2,t): 
L nat,t = a + b LEU,t + ut  (2.3) 
A first cointegration testing procedure relies on the Durbin-Watson 
statistics (DW). The null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected when 
the calculated DW values resulting from the regression of equation (2.3) are 
larger than the critical values. As Engle & Granger point out, the Durbin-
Watson test can be used as a good but only approximate indicator for 
cointegration and should be followed by a more specific testing procedure 
such as the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The 
Dickey-Fuller test is based on the residuals of the cointegration regression: 
Δût =  -δ0 ût-1 + εt  (2.4) 
where the t-statistic for the estimated coefficient -δ0 provides an indication 
regarding the cointegration of the two series. In particular, the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration can be rejected when the t-statistic is larger in absolute 
value than the critical value. 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is obtained in a two-step procedure 
from the regression: 
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Δût =  -δ0  ût-1 + ∑
=
4
1 i
δi  Δût-i + εt  (2.5) 
In the first step, equation (2.5) is estimated including all four lags of Δût-i. In 
the second step, equation (2.5) is re-estimated including only the significant 
lags of Δût-i from the first step. Now, the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
can be rejected when the t-statistic for the estimated coefficient -δ0 is larger in 
absolute value than the critical value. 
Once the existence of a long-term relationship, i.e. cointegration is 
established, one can investigate the short-term dynamics of interest rates by 
estimating the corresponding error correction model (ECM). This model will 
provide an estimate of the speed of adjustment with which the system returns 
back to the long-term equilibrium. To find the correct specification of the ECM, 
first an unrestricted vector autoregression (UVAR) is estimated based on the 
regression: 
ΔLnat,t= λ0 + λ1 Lnat,t-1 + λ2 LEU,t-1 + ∑
=
4
1 i
λnati ΔLnat,t-i  + ∑
=
4
1 i
 
λEUi ΔLEU,t-i + εt  (2.6) 
From this regression, the significant lagged first differences of the 
exogenous and endogenous variables are identified and included in the final 
ECM in combination with any error correction terms ECT obtained from the 
estimated errors that were found to be significant in the cointegration 
regression 
ΔLnat,t = ϕ0 + ϕ1 ût-1 + ∑
=
4
1 i
ϕnati Lnat,t-i  + ∑
=
4
1 i
ϕEUi LEU,t-i + εt   (2.7) 
The estimated coefficient ϕ1 of the ECT measures the speed of adjustment. For 
example, an estimated ϕ1 of -0.2 indicates that if there is a shock to the national 
lending rate Lnat,t, which raises its value relative to the equilibrium relationship 
to the cointegrated EU-wide lending rate LEU,t, then one-fifth of the divergence 
is eliminated in the following period. 
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Traditionally, the pass-through process has simply been modelled as a VAR 
process (Cottarelli & Kourelis, 1994): 
t i t
* n
1 i
i M, t 1 i t
* k
1 i
i BR, 0 t ε M β M β BR β β BR + + + + = −
=
−
= ∑ ∑  (3.1) 
where BRt and Mt are lending and market rates, respectively, and k* and n* 
indicate the optimal lag lengths. Note that whenever an optimal lag length has 
to be determined, the minimum AIC criterion is used, allowing for a maximum 
of four lags. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the time series for 
interest rates typically exhibit an I(1) property. In this case, the empirical pass-
through model is best estimated using first differences: 
t i t
* n
1 i
i M, t 1 i t
* k
1 i
i BR, t ε ΔM β ΔM β ΔBR β ΔBR + + + = −
=
−
= ∑ ∑  (3.2) 
This specification avoids spurious regression problems but leads to a loss of 
information about long-term relationships. Fortunately, this information can be 
recovered if BR and M are cointegrated. The VAR then needs to be augmented 
by an (lagged) error correction term (ECT):  
t 1 t ECT i t
* n
1 i
i M, t 1 i t
* k
1 i
i BR, t ε ECT β ΔM β ΔM β ΔBR β ΔBR + + + + = − −
=
−
= ∑ ∑  (3.3) 
The ECT measures the deviation from the long-term equilibrium, which can be 
obtained from the estimated error of the cointegration regression: 
t t 0 t u θM θ BR + + =   (3.4) 
The appropriate version of the pass-through model as either equation 
(3.1), (3.2) or (3.3) depends on the time series and cointegration properties of 
the interest rate series. In all specifications, the impact multiplier is estimated 
by the coefficient β1. A value of less than 1 indicates sluggish adjustment, also 
known as lending rate stickiness. The long-term relationship between market 
rates and retail rates is given by equation (3.4) and can be interpreted either as 
a cointegration relationship or as the long-term solution of the VAR. The long-
term multiplier θ can be directly obtained from estimating equation (3.4) if the 
rates are cointegrated. Otherwise, the long-term multiplier has to be calculated 
from (3.1) or (3.2) as: 92 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
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∑
∑
=
=
−
+
= * k
1 i BR,i
* n
1 i
M,i 1
β 1
β β
θ  (3.5) 
A full pass-through in the long run is reflected by θ=1. An imperfect pass-
through (θ<1) could be caused by a less than perfect elasticity of demand for 
banking products, the existence of market power, a lack of market 
contestability, switching costs or information asymmetries. If the long-term 
pass-through is found to be overshooting (θ>1) in lending markets, this can be 
interpreted as a situation where banks increase lending rates to compensate for 
higher risks instead of rationing credit. 
Given the major developments in the eurozone since 1992, the long-term 
relationship may be subject to structural changes. Instead of exogenously 
postulating a break point and then testing for its presence, the presence and 
timing of the break can be determined endogenously by estimating a 
supremum F (supF) test for equation (3.4). This test can be interpreted as a 
rolling test where standard Chow tests are conducted for a series of different 
break points, which move through the mid-80% of the sample period. For 
details on this test see Andrews (1993), Diebold & Chen (1996) and Hansen 
(1992). SupF equals the largest Chow F-statistic and is compared with critical 
values as reported by Hansen (1992). On the basis of these tests, pre- and post-
break periods can be constructed for every national retail interest rate. This 
allows the researcher to obtain additional information on the timing of 
structural changes and to estimate pass-through models for break-free sample 
periods.  
While most pass-through studies focus on symmetric adjustment 
towards the long-term equilibrium, Sander & Kleimeier (2002) advocate that 
threshold and asymmetric adjustment mechanisms should both be considered 
for two main reasons. First, retail rate adjustment patterns in the eurozone are 
indeed frequently either asymmetric or occur only beyond a certain threshold. 
Therefore, they should not be ignored. Second, using models with asymmetries 
allows us to detect cointegration in cases where there are asymmetries and 
where other methods would thus fail to detect cointegration and wrongly re-
direct the researcher to the pass-through model of equation (3.2). 
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Five asymmetric specifications for the adjustment of interest rates are 
considered. We start by considering the symmetric pass-through model. Here 
the ECT is defined as 
ECTt-1 = ut-1  (3.6) 
and cointegration testing is based on the Durbin–Watson (DW), Dickey–Fuller 
(DF) and augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests. As the first asymmetric model, 
we consider the threshold autoregressive model (TAR0) developed by Tong 
(1983). The model distinguishes whether the explained interest rate is above or 
below its equilibrium level. Hence, the TAR0 allows for asymmetric adjustment 
depending on the sign of the equilibrium deviation. For example, if the money 
market rate decreases without an immediate adjustment of the lending rate, we 
obtain a positive realisation of the error term ut. When in this case the 
autoregressive decay is faster than in the case of money market rate increases, 
the lending rate adjustment is faster downwards than upwards. For this TAR0 
model, the ECT is defined as 
ECTt-1 = It ut-1 + (1- It) ut-1  (3.7) 
where It represents a Heaviside indicator for different states of ut-1 such that 
⎩
⎨
⎧
<
≥
=
−
−
0 u if 0
0 u if 1
I
1 t
1 t
t  (3.8) 
Using this definition we estimate equation (3.9):  
t
* m
1 i
i t i 2 1 t 2 t 1 t 1 t t ε Δu ρ u )ρ I (1 u ρ I Δu + + − + = ∑
=
− + − −  (3.9) 
Cointegration testing takes the form of a modified ADF test. The null of no 
cointegration is rejected if the estimated F-statistic for H0:  ρ1 = ρ2  = 0 is 
statistically significant based on critical values provided by Enders & Siklos 
(2001). If cointegration is established, an F-test for H0: ρ1 = ρ2 indicates the 
presence of asymmetry. 
The second asymmetric model (TAR*) is a modification of the TAR0 in 
the sense that the threshold is now allowed to deviate from zero. The rationale 
is that retail rates may adjust differently to a disequilibrium once a certain 
minimum deviation in one direction is exceeded. For the TAR* model, the 
Heaviside indicator in conjunction with equation (3.7) is defined as 94 | KLEIMEIER & SANDER 
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⎩
⎨
⎧
<
≥
=
−
−
*
0 1 t
*
0 1 t
t a u if 0
a u if 1
I  (3.10) 
Following Chan (1993), the optimal threshold a0* is found by searching over 
the mid-80% of the distribution of ut and selecting the model for which the 
residual sum of squares is minimised. For both the TAR* and the following B-
TAR* model, the optimal lag length m* of the TAR0 specification is used. 
Cointegration and asymmetry testing proceeds with the above-described F-
tests. 
The third variation is a Band-TAR model (B-TAR*), which can reflect   
interest rate stickiness, driven by the menu-cost behaviour of banks, as well as 
interest rate smoothing. For example, menu-cost behaviour could be relevant if 
cointegration is found only outside a band bordered by a0* and –a0*. For the B-
TAR* model, the Heaviside indicator in conjunction with equation (3.7) is now 
defined as  
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
− ≤ =
< =
≥ =
=
−
−
−
otherwise 0 and a u if 1 I
otherwise 0 and a | u | if 1 I
otherwise 0 and a u if 1 I
I
*
0 1 t 3t
*
0 1 t 2t
*
0 1 t t 1
jt
 (3.11) 
while equation (3.9) is modified to 
t
* m
1 i
i t i 3 1 t 3 3t 1 t 2 2t 1 t 1 1t t ε Δu ρ u I u I u I Δu + + ρ + ρ + ρ = ∑
=
− + − − −  (3.12) 
The F-tests for cointegration and asymmetry are now applied to all three 
coefficients ρj. 
Finally, the fourth and fifth asymmetric models represent momentum 
threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) models. In the TAR models, the 
autoregressive decay always depends on the degree of deviation from 
equilibrium. In contrast, in the M-TAR approach the adjustment speed 
depends on how fast the rates move away from or towards equilibrium. As 
such, M-TAR adjustment can reflect the behaviour of banks that attempt to 
smooth out large changes in the market rate. In this case, the Heaviside 
indicator depends on the change in the error correction term Δut such that 
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⎩
⎨
⎧
<
≥
=
−
−
0 1 t
0 1 t
t a Δu if 0
a Δu if 1
I  (3.13) 
The ECT is defined accordingly. The optimal lag length of the M-TAR0 model 
is used for the M-TAR* model. In a manner similar to the TAR0 and TAR* 
specifications, M-TAR models can either be estimated with a threshold a0 = 0 
leading to the M-TAR0 specification or can be optimised at a0 = a0* > 0 leading 
to the M-TAR* specification. 
The objective of this methodology is to obtain the optimal pass-through 
model rather than arbitrarily selecting one. As such, break-free sub-periods are 
identified. Then one proceeds with unit root testing. If the rates are I(0), the 
pass-through model is estimated as in equation (3.1). If the rates are I(1), all 
five asymmetric TAR-type models are estimated and the best asymmetric 
model is selected based on the AIC criterion and this best model is tested for 
asymmetric cointegration. If asymmetric cointegration is confirmed, the pass-
through model is estimated as in equation (3.3) with the appropriate 
asymmetric ECT. If asymmetric cointegration is rejected, symmetric 
cointegration testing is required and – if confirmed – symmetric ECT is 
included in the pass-through model of equation (3.3). If symmetric 
cointegration is also rejected, the pass-through model is estimated according to 
equation (3.2) without any ECT. Finally, based on the selected pass-through, 
model multipliers can be obtained for a variety of positive and negative 
interest rate shocks. 
 
Source: Kleimeier & Sander (2004). 